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In rational choice theory, individuals are assumed always to choose the op-
tion that will provide them maximum utility. But actual choices must be based
on subjective perceptions of the attributes of the available options, and the ac-
curacy of these perceptions will always be limited by the information-processing
capacity of one’s nervous system. I propose a theory of valuation errors under
the hypothesis that perceptions are as accurate as possible on average, given
the statistical properties of the environment to which they are adapted, subject
to a limit on processing capacity. The theory is similar to the “rational inatten-
tion” hypothesis of Sims (1998, 2003, 2011), but modified for closer conformity
with psychophysical and neurobiological evidence regarding visual perception.
It can explain a variety of aspects of observed choice behavior, including the in-
trinsic stochasticity of choice; focusing effects; decoy effects in consumer choice;
reference-dependent valuations; and the co-existence of apparent risk-aversion
with respect to gains with apparent risk-seeking with respect to losses. The
theory provides optimizing foundations for some aspects of the prospect theory
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
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Experiments by psychologists (and experimental economists) have documented
a wide range of anomalies that are difficult to reconcile with the model of rational
choice that provides the foundation for conventional economic theory. This raises an
important challenge for economic theory. Can standard theory be generalized in such
a way as to account for the anomalies, or must one start afresh from entirely different
foundations?
In order for a theory consistent with experimental evidence to count as a gener-
alization of standard economic theory, it would need to have at least two properties.
First, it would still have to be a theory which explains observed behavior as optimal,
given people’s goals and the constraints on their behavior — though it might specify
goals and constraints that differ from the standard ones. And second, it ought to
nest standard theory as a limiting case of the more general theory.
Here I sketch the outlines of one such theory, that I believe holds promise as
an explanation for several (though certainly not all) well-established experimental
anomalies. These include stochastic choice, so that a given subject will not necessar-
ily make the same choice on different occasions, even when presented with the same
choice set, and so may exhibit apparently inconsistent preferences; focusing effects, in
which some attributes of the choices available to a decisionmaker are given dispropor-
tionate weight (relative to the person’s true preferences), while others (that do affect
true utility) may be neglected altogether; choice-set effects, in which the likelihood of
choosing one of two options may be affected by the other options that are available,
even when the other options are not chosen; reference-dependence, in which choice
among options depends not merely upon the final situation that the decisionmaker
should expect to reach as a result of each of the possible choices, but upon how those
final situations compare to a reference point established by a prior situation or expec-
tations; and the co-existence of risk-aversion with respect to gains with risk-seeking
with respect to losses, as predicted by the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979).
There are three touchstones for the approach that I propose to take to the expla-
nation of these phenomena. The first is the observation by McFadden (1999) that
many of the best-established behavioral anomalies relate to — or can at least po-
tentially be explained by — errors in perception, under which heading he includes
errors in the retrieval of memories of past experiences. Because of the pervasiveness
of the evidence for perceptual errors, McFadden argues that economic theory should
be extended to allow for them. But he suggests that “if the cognitive anomalies that
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do appear in economic behavior arise mostly from perception errors, then much of
the conventional apparatus of economic analysis survives, albeit in a form in which
history and experience are far more important than is traditionally allowed” (p. 99).
Here I seek to follow this lead, by examining the implications of a theory in which
economic choices are optimal, subject to the constraint that they must be based
on subjective perceptions of the available choices. I further seek to depart from
standard theory as minimally as possible, while accounting for observed behavior, by
postulating that the perceptions of decisionmakers are themselves optimal, subject
to a constraint on the decisionmaker’s information-processing capacity. Standard
rational choice theory is then nested as a special case of the more general theory
proposed here, the one in which available information-processing capacity is sufficient
to allow for accurate perceptions of the relevant features of one’s situation.
A second touchstone is the argument of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that key
postulates of prospect theory are psychologically realistic, on the ground that they
are “compatible with basic principles of perception and judgment” in other domains,
notably perceptions of “attributes such as brightness, loudness, or temperature” (pp.
277-278). Here I pursue this analogy further, by proposing an account of the relevant
constraints on information-processing that can also explain at least some salient as-
pects of the processing of sensory information in humans and other organisms. This
has the advantage of allowing the theory to be tested against a much larger body of
data, as perception has been studied much more thoroughly (and in quantitatively
rigorous ways), both by experimental psychologists and by neuroscientists, in sensory
domains such as vision.
More specifically, the theory proposed here seeks to develop an idea stressed
by Glimcher (2011) in his discussion of how a neurologically grounded economics
would differ from current theory: that judgements of value are necessarily reference-
dependent, because “neurobiological constraints ... make it clear that the hardware
requirements for a reference point-free model ... cannot in principle be met” (p.
274). I do not here consider constraints that may result from specific structures of
the nervous system, but I do pursue the idea that reference-dependence is not simply
an arbitrary fact, but may be necessary, or at least an efficient solution, given con-
straints on what it is possible for brains to do, given fundamental limitations that
result from their being finite systems.
The third touchstone is the theory of “rational inattention” developed by Sims
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(1998, 2003, 2011). Sims proposes that the relevant constraint on the precision of
economic decisionmakers’ awareness of their circumstances can be formulated using
the quantitative measure of information transmission proposed by Shannon (1948),
and extensively used by communications engineers. An advantage of information
theory for this purpose is the fact that it allows a precise quantitative limit on the
accuracy of perceptions to be defined, in a way that does not require some single,
highly specific assumption about what might be perceived and what types of errors
might be made in order for the theory to be applied. This abstract character of the
theory means that it is at least potentially relevant across many different domains.1
Hence if any general theory of perceptual limitations is to be possible — as opposed
to a large number of separate studies of heuristics and biases in individual, fairly
circumscribed domains — information theory provides a natural language in which
to seek to express it. Here I do not adopt the precise quantitative formulation of the
relevant constraint on information processing proposed by Sims; instead, I propose a
modification of rational inattention theory that I believe conforms better to findings
from empirical studies of perception. But the theory proposed here remains a close
cousin of the one proposed by Sims.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, I review some of the empirical evi-
dence regarding visual perception that motivates the particular quantitative limit on
the accuracy of perceptions that I use in what follows. Section 2 then derives the im-
plications for perceptual errors in the evaluation of economic choices that follow from
the hypothesis of an optimal information structure to the particular kind of constraint
that is motivated in the previous section. Section 3 discusses several ways in which
this theory can provide interpretations of apparently anomalous aspects of choice
behavior in economic contexts, that have already received considerable attention in
the literature on behavioral economics, and compares the present theory to other
proposals that seek to explain some of the same phenomena. Section 4 concludes.
1Indeed, a number of psychologists and neuroscientists have already sought to characterize limits
to human and animal perception using concepts from information theory. See, for example, Attneave
(1954) and Miller (1956) from the psychology literature, or Barlow (1961), Laughlin (1981), Rieke
et al. (1997), or Dayan and Abbott (2001), chap. 4, for applications in the neurosciences.
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1 What Do Perceptual Systems Economize?
I shall begin by discussing the form of constraint on the degree of precision of people’s
awareness of their environment that is suggested by available evidence from experi-
mental psychology and neurobiology. I wish to consider a general class of hypotheses
about the nature of perceptual limitations, according to which the perceptual mech-
anisms that have developed are optimally adapted to the organism’s circumstances,
subject to certain limits on the degree of precision of information of any type that
it would be feasible for the organism to obtain. And I am interested in hypotheses
about the constraints on information-processing capacity that can be formulated as
generally as possible, so that the nature of the constraint need not be discovered
independently for each particular context in which the theory is to apply.
If high-level principles exist that determine the structure of perception across a
wide range of contexts, then we need not look for them simply by considering evi-
dence regarding perceptions in the context of economic decisionmaking. In fact, the
nature of perception, and the cognitive and neurobiological mechanisms involved in
it, has been studied much more extensively in the case of sensory perception, and of
visual and auditory perception particularly. I accordingly start by reviewing some of
the findings from the literatures in experimental psychology and neuroscience about
relations between the objective properties of sensory stimuli and the subjective per-
ception or neural representation of those stimuli, in the hope of discovering principles
that may also be relevant to perception in economic choice situations.
I shall review this literature with a specific and fairly idiosyncratic goal, which
is to consider the degree to which the experimental evidence provides support for
either of two important general hypotheses about perceptual limitations that have
been proposed by economic theorists. These are the model of partial information as
an optimally chosen partition of the states of the world, as proposed in Gul et al.
(2011), and the theory of “rational inattention” proposed by Sims (1998, 2003, 2011).
1.1 The Stochasticity of Perception
Economic theorists often model partial information of decisionmakers about the cir-
cumstances under which they must choose by a partition of the possible states of the
world; it is assumed that a decisionmaker (DM) is correctly informed about which
element of the partition contains the current state of the world, but that the DM has
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no ability to discriminate among states of the world that belong to the same element
of the partition. This is not the only way that one might model partial awareness, but
it has been a popular one; Lipman (1995) argues that limited information must be
modeled this way in the case of “an agent who is fully aware of how he is processing
his information” (p. 43).
In an approach of this kind, more precise information about the current state
corresponds to a finer partition. One might then consider partial information to
nonetheless represent a constrained-optimal information structure, if it is optimal
(from the point of view of expected payoff that it allows the DM to obtain) subject
to an upper bound on the number of states that can be distinguished (i.e., the num-
ber of elements that there can be in the partition of states of the world), or to an
information-processing cost that is an increasing function of the number of states. For
example, Neyman (1985) and Rubinstein (1986) consider constrained-optimal play of
repeated games, when the players’ strategies are constrained not to require an ability
to distinguish among too many different possible past histories of play; Gul et al.
(2011) propose a model of general competitive equilibrium in which traders’ strate-
gies are optimal subject to a bound on the number of different states of the world
that may be distinguished. This way of modeling the constraint on DMs’ awareness
of their circumstances has the advantage of being applicable under completely general
assumptions about the nature of the uncertainty. The study of optimal information
structures in this sense also corresponds to a familiar problem in the computer science
literature, namely the analysis of “optimal quantization” in coding theory (Sayood,
2005).
However, it does not seem likely that human perceptual limitations can be un-
derstood as optimal under any constraint of this type. Any example of what Lipman
(1995) calls “partitional” approaches to modeling information limitations implies that
the DM’s subjective representation of the state of the world is a deterministic function
of the true state: the DM is necessarily aware of the unique element of the informa-
tion partition to which the true state of the world belongs. And different states of the
world can either be perfectly discriminated from one another (because they belong
to separate elements of the partition, and the DM will necessarily be aware of one
element or the other), or cannot be distinguished from one another at all (because
they belong to the same element of the partition, so that the DM’s awareness will
always be identical in the two cases): there are no degrees of discriminability.
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Yet one of the most elementary findings in the area of psychophysics — the study
by experimental psychologists of the relation between subjective perceptions and the
objective physical characteristics of sensory stimuli — is that subjects respond ran-
domly when asked to distinguish between two relatively similar stimuli. Rather than
mapping the boundaries of disjoint sets of stimuli that are indistinguishable from one
another (but perfectly distinguishable from all stimuli in any other equivalence class),
psychophysicists plot the way in which the probability that a subject recognizes one
stimulus as brighter (or higher-pitched, or louder, or heavier...) than another varies
as the physical characteristics of the stimuli are varied; the data are generally con-
sistent with the view that the relationship (called a “psychometric function”) varies
continuously between the values of zero and one, that are approached only in the case
of stimuli that are sufficiently different.2 Thus, for example, Thurstone (1959) refor-
mulates Weber’s Law as: “The stimulus increase which is correctly discriminated in
any specified proportion of attempts (except 0 and 100 percent) is a constant fraction
of the stimulus magnitude.” How exactly and over what range of stimulus intensities
this law actually holds has been the subject of a considerable subsequent literature;
but there has been no challenge to the idea that any lawful relationships to be found
between stimulus intensities and discriminability must be stochastic relations of this
kind.
Under the standard paradigm for interpretation of such measurements, known
as “signal detection theory” (Green and Swets, 1966), the stochasticity of subjects’
responses is attributed to the existence of a probability distribution of subjective
perceptions associated with each objectively defined stimulus.3 The probability of
error in identifying which stimulus has been observed is then determined by the
degree to which the distributions of possible subjective perceptions overlap;4 stimuli
that are objectively more similar are mistaken for one another more often, because
2See, for example, Gabbiani and Cox (2010), chap. 25; Glimcher (2011), chap. 4; Green and
Swets (1966); or Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessel (2010), Box 21-1.
3This interpretation dates back at least to Thurstone (1927), who calls the random subjective
representations “discriminal processes,” and postulates that they are Gaussian random variables.
4Of course, even given a stochastic relationship between the objective stimulus and its subjec-
tive representation, there remains the question of how the subject’s response is determined by the
subjective representation. In “ideal observer theory,” the response is the one implied to be optimal
under statistical decision theory: the response function maximizes the subject’s expected reward,
given some prior probability distribution over the set of stimuli that are expected to be encountered.
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the probabilities of occurrence of the various possible subjective perceptions are quite
similar (though not identical) in this case. Interestingly, the notion that the subjective
representation is a random function of the objective characteristics is no longer merely
a conjecture; studies such as that of Britten et al. (1992) — who record the electrical
activity of a neuron in the relevant region of the cortex of a monkey trained to signal
perceptual discriminations, while the stimulus is presented — show that random
variation in the neural coding of particular stimuli can indeed explain the observed
frequency of errors in perceptual discriminations.
In order to explain the actual partial ability of human (or animal) subjects to
discriminate between alternative situations, then, one needs to posit a stochastic
relationship between the objective state and the subjective representation of the state.
A satisfactory formalization of a constraint on the degree of precision of awareness
of the environment that is possible — or of the cost of more precise awareness —
must accordingly be defined not simply for partitions, but for arbitrary information
structures that specify a set of possible subjective representations R and a conditional
probability distribution p(r|x) for each true state of the world x. It should furthermore
be such that it is more costly for an information structure to discriminate more
accurately between different states, by making the conditional distributions p(·|x)
more different for different states x. But in order to decide which type of cost function
is more realistic, it is useful to consider further experimental evidence regarding
perceptual discriminations.
1.2 Experimental Evidence on the Allocation of Attention
While the studies cited above make it fairly clear that subjective perceptions are
stochastically related to the objective characteristics of the environment, it may not
be obvious that there is any scope for variation in this relationship, so as to make it
better adapted to a particular task or situation. Perhaps the probability distribution
of subjective perceptions associated with a particular objective state is simply a
necessary consequence of the way the perceptual system is built, and will be the
same in all settings. In that case, the nature of this relationship could be an object of
study; but it might be necessary to make a separate study of the limits of perception
of every distinct aspect of the world, with little expectation of finding any useful
high-level generalizations.
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There is, however, a certain amount of evidence indicating that people are able to
vary the amount of attention that they pay to different aspects of their surroundings.
Some aspects of this are commonplace; for example, we can pay more attention to a
certain part of our surroundings by looking in that direction. The eye only receives
light from a certain range of angles; moreover, the concentration of the light-sensitive
cone cells in the retina is highest at a particular small area, the fovea, so that visual
discrimination is sharpest for that part of the visual field that is projected onto
the fovea. This implies opportunities for (and constraints upon) the allocation of
attention that are very relevant to certain tasks (such as the question of how one
should move about a classroom in order to best deter cheating on an exam), but that
do not have obvious implications for more general classes of information processing
problems. Of greater relevance for present purposes is evidence suggesting that even
given the information reaching the different parts of the retina, people can vary the
extent to which they attend to different parts of the visual field, through variation in
what is done with this information in subsequent levels of processing.5
1.2.1 The Experiment of Shaw and Shaw (1977)
A visual perception experiment reported by Shaw and Shaw (1977) is of particular
interest. In the experiment, a letter (either E, T, or V ) would briefly appear on a
screen, after which the subject had to report which letter had been presented. The
letter would be chosen randomly (independently across trials, with equal probability
of each of the three letters appearing on each trial), and would appear at one of eight
possible locations on the screen, equally spaced around an imaginary circle; the loca-
tion would also be chosen randomly (independently across trials, and independently
of the letter chosen). The probability of appearance at the different locations was
not necessarily uniform across locations; but the subjects were told the probability
pii of appearance at each location i in advance. The question studied was the degree
to which the subjects’ ability to successfully discriminate between the appearances
of the different letters would differ depending on the location at which the letter
appeared, and the extent to which this difference in the degree of attention paid to
each location would vary with the likelihood of observing the letter at that location.
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Figure 1: The experimental results of Shaw and Shaw (1977), when the letters appear
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Figure 2: The experimental results of Shaw and Shaw (1977), when the letters appear
with different frequencies at different locations. Data from Table 2 , Shaw and Shaw
(1977).
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The experimental data are shown in Figures 1 and 2 for two different probability
distributions {pii}. Each panel plots (with triangles) the fraction of correct responses
as a function of the location around the circle (indicated on the horizontal axis)
for one of the four subjects.6 In Figure 1, the probabilities of appearance at each
location (indicated by the solid grey bars at the bottom of each panel) are equal
across locations. In this case, for subjects 1-3, the frequency of correct discrimination
is close to uniform across the eight locations; indeed, Shaw and Shaw report that one
cannot reject the hypothesis that the error probability at each location is identical,
and that the observed frequency differences are due purely to sampling error. (The
behavior of subject 4 is more erratic, involving apparent biases toward paying more
attention to certain locations, of a kind that do not represent an efficient adaptation
to the task.)
Figure 2 then shows the corresponding fraction of correct responses at each lo-
cation when the probabilities of the letters’ appearing at the different locations are
no longer uniform; as indicated by the grey bars, in this case the letters are most
likely to appear at 0◦ or 180◦, and least likely to appear at either 90◦ or 270◦. The
probabilities for the non-uniform case are chosen so that there are two locations, dis-
tant from one another, at each of which it will be desirable to pay particularly close
attention; in this way the experiment is intended to test whether attention is divisible
among locations, and not simply able to be focused on alternative directions. In fact,
the non-uniform distribution continues to be symmetric with respect to reflections
around both the vertical and horizontal axes; the symmetry of the task thus continues
to encourage fixation of the subject’s gaze in the exact center of the circle, as in the
uniform case. Any change in the capacity for discrimination at the different locations
should then indicate a change in the mental processing of visual information, rather
than a simple change in the orientation of the eye.
As shown in Figure 2, the data reported by Shaw and Shaw indicate that in the
case of all except subject 4, the frequency of correct discrimination does not remain
constant across locations when the frequency of appearance at the different locations
ceases to be uniform; instead, the frequency of correct responses rises at the locations
that are used most frequently (0◦ and 180◦) and falls at the locations that are used
least frequently (90◦ and 270◦). Thus subjects do appear to be able to reallocate
6The location labeled 0◦, corresponding to the top of the circle, is shown twice (as both 0◦ and
360◦), to make clear the symmetry of the setup.
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their attention within the visual field, and to multiple locations, without doing so
by changing their direction of gaze; and they seem to do this in a way that serves
to increase their efficiency at letter-recognition, by allocating more attention to the
locations where it matters more to their performance.
These results indicate that the nature of people’s ability to discriminate between
alternative situations is not a fixed characteristic of their sensory organs, but instead
adapts according to the context in which the discrimination must be made. Nor
are the results consistent with the view (as in the classic “signal detection theory” of
Green and Swets, 1966) that each objective state is associated with a fixed probability
distribution of subjective perceptions, and that is only the cutoffs that determine
which subjective perceptions result in a particular behavioral response that adjust
in response to changes in the frequency with which stimuli are encountered. For in
moving between the first experimental situation and the second, the probability of
presentative of an E as opposed to a T or V at any given location does not change;
hence there is no reason for a change in a subject’s propensity to report an E when
experiencing a subjective perception that might represent either an E or a T at
the 0◦ location. Evidently, instead, the degree of overlap between the probability
distributions of subjective perceptions conditional upon particular objective states
changes — becoming greater in the case of the different letters appearing at 90◦ and
less in the case of the different letters appearing at 0◦. But how can we model this
change, and under what conception of the possibilities for such adaptation might
the observed adaptation be judged an optimal response to the changed experimental
conditions?
1.2.2 Sims’s Hypothesis of Rational Inattention
Sims (1998, 2003, 2011) proposes a general theory of the optimal allocation of limited
attention that might appear well-suited to the explanation of findings of this kind.
Sims assumes that a DM makes her decision (i.e., chooses her action) on the basis of
a subjective perception (or mental representation) of the state of the world r, where
the probability of experiencing a particular subjective perception r in the case that
the true state of the world is x is determined by a set of conditional probabilities
{p(r|x)}. The formalism is a very general one, that makes no general assumption
about the kind of sets to which the possible values of x and r may belong. There
is no assumption, for example, that x and r must be vectors of the same dimension;
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indeed, it is possible that the set of possible values for one variable is continuous while
the other variable is discrete. The hypothesis of rational inattention (RI) asserts
that the set of possible representations r and the conditional probabilities {p(r|x)}
are precisely those that allow as high as possible a value for the DM’s performance
objective (say, the expected number of correct decisions), subject to an upper bound
on the information that the representation conveys about the state.
The quantity of information conveyed by the representation is measured by Shan-








where p(r) is the frequency of occurrence of representation r (given the conditional
probabilities {p(r|x)} and the frequency of occurrence of each of the objective states
x), and the expected value of the function of r and x is computed using the joint
distribution for r and x implied by the frequency of occurrence of the objective
states and the conditional probabilities {p(r|x)}. This can be shown (see, e.g., Cover
and Thomas, 2006) to be the average amount by which observation of r reduces
uncertainty about the state x, if the ex ante uncertainty about x is measured by the
entropy
H(X) ≡ −E [log pi(x)] ,
where pi(x) is the (unconditional) probability of occurrence of the state x, and the
uncertainty after observing r is measured by the corresponding entropy, computed
using the conditional probabilities pi(x|r). Equivalently, the mutual information is
the average amount by which knowledge of the state x would reduce uncertainty
(as measured by entropy) about what the representation r will be.7 Not only is this
concept defined for stochastic representations; the proposed form of constraint implies
that there is an advantage to stochastic representations, insofar as a “fuzzier” relation
between x and r reduces the mutual information, and so relaxes the constraint.
7The formula (1.1) for mutual information follows directly from the definition of entropy and
this second characterization. While the first characterization provides better intuition for why this
should be a reasonable measure of the informativeness of the representation r, I have written the
formula (1.1) in terms of the conditional probabilities {p(r|x)} rather than the {pi(x|r)}, because
this expression makes it more obvious how the choice of the conditional probabilities {p(r|x)}, which
are a more natural way of specifying the design problem, is constrained by a bound on the mutual
information.
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Rather than assuming that some performance measure Π is maximized subject to
an upper bound on I, one might alternatively suppose that additional information-
processing capacity can be allocated to this particular task at a cost, and that the
information structure and decision rule are chosen so as to maximize Π − θI, where
θ > 0 is a unit cost of information-processing capacity.8 This latter version of the
theory assumes that the DM is constrained only by some bound on the sum of the
information processing capacity used in each of some large number of independent
tasks; if the information requirements of the particular task under analysis are small
enough relative to this global constraint, the shadow cost of additional capacity can be
treated as independent of the quantity of information used in this task. A constrained-
optimal information structure in any given problem can be equally well described in
either of the two ways (as maximizing Π given the quantity of information used, or as
maximizing Π− θI for some shadow price θ); the distinction matters, however, when
we wish to ask how the information structure should change when the task changes,
as in the movement from the first experimental situation to the second in experiment
of Shaw and Shaw. We might assume that the bound on I remains unchanged when
the probabilities {pii} change, or alternatively we might assume that the shadow price
θ should remain unchanged across the two experiments. The latter assumption would
imply not only that attention can be reallocated among the different locations that
may be attended to in the experiment, but that attention can also be reallocated
between this experiment and other matters of which the subject is simultaneously
aware.
Because Sims’s measure of the cost of being better informed implies that allowing
a greater degree of overlap between the probability distributions of subjective repre-
sentations associated with different objective states reduces the information cost, it
might seem to be precisely the sort of measure needed to explain the results obtained
by Shaw and Shaw (for their first three subjects) as an optimal adaptation to the
change in the experimental setup. But in fact it makes no such prediction.
Suppose that (as in the pure formulation of Sims’s theory) there are no other con-
straints on what the set of possible representations r or the conditional probabilities
{p(r|x)} may be. In the experiment of Shaw and Shaw, the state x (the objective
properties of the stimulus on a given trial) has two dimensions, the location i at
which the stimulus appears, and the letter j that appears, and under the prior these
8This is the version of the theory used, for example, in Woodford (2009).
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two random variables are distributed independently of one another. In addition, only
the value of j is payoff-relevant (the subject’s reward for announcing a given letter
is independent of the location i, but depends on the true letter j). Then it is easy
to show that an optimal information structure will provide no information about the
value of i: the conditional probabilities p(r|x) = p(r|ij) will be functions only of j,
and so can be written p(r|j).
The problem then reduces to the choice of a set of possible representations r
and conditional probabilities {p(r|j)} so as to maximize the probability of a correct








where the expectation E[·] now represents an integral over the joint distribution of j
and r implied by the conditional probabilities. This problem depends on the prior
probabilities of appearance of the different letters j, but does not involve the prior
probabilities of the different locations {pii}. Since the prior probabilities of the three
letters are the same across the two experimental designs, the solution to this optimum
problem is the same, and this version of RI theory implies that the probability of
correct responses at each of the eight locations should be identical across the two
experiments. This is of course not at all consistent with the experimental results of
Shaw and Shaw.
Why is this theory inadequate? Under the assumption that the DM could choose
to pay attention solely to the letter that appears and not to its location, it would
clearly be optimal to ignore the latter information; and there would be no reason
for the subject’s information-processing strategy to be location-dependent, as it is
evidently is under the second experimental design. It appears, then, that it is not
possible (or at any rate, not costlessly possible) to first classify stimuli as Es, T s or V s,
and then subsequently decide how much information about that summary statistic to
pass on for use in the final decision. It is evidently necessary for the visual system to
separately observe information about what is happening at each of the eight different
locations in the visual field, and at least some of the information-processing constraint
must relate to the separate processing of these individual information streams — as
opposed to there being only a constraint on the rate of information flow to the final
decision stage, after the information obtained from the different streams has been
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optimally combined.9
Let us suppose, then, that the only information structures that can be considered
are ones under which the subject will necessarily be aware of the location i at which
the letter has appeared (though not necessarily making a correct identification of the
letter that has appeared there). One way of formalizing this constraint is to assume





and that the conditional probabilities must satisfy
p(Ri|ij) = 1 ∀i, j (1.3)
We then wish to consider the choice of an information structure and decision rule to
maximize the expected number of correct responses, subject to constraints (1.2)–(1.3)
and an upper bound on the possible value of the quantity I defined in (1.1).
As usual in problems of this kind, one can show that an optimal information
structure reveals only the choice that should be made as a result of the signal; any
additional information would only increase the size of the mutual information I with
no improvement in the probability of a correct response.10 Hence we may suppose
that the subjective representation is of the form ik, where i indicates the location at
which a letter is seen (necessarily revealed, by assumption) and k is the response that
the subject gives as a result of this representation. We therefore need only to specify
the conditional probabilities {p(ik|ij)} for i = 1, . . . , 8, and j, k = 1, 2, 3. Moreover,
because of the symmetry of the problem under permutations of the three letters, it is
easily seen that the optimal information structure must possess the same symmetry.
9The issue is one that arises in macroeconomic applications of RI theory, whenever there is a
possibility of observing more than one independent aspect of the state of the world. For example,
Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) consider a model in which both aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks have implications for a firm’s optimal price, and assume a form of RI theory in which
firms must observe separate signals (each more or less precise, according to the firm’s attention
allocation decision) about the two types of shocks, rather than being able to observe a signal that is
a noisy measurement of an optimal linear combination of the two state variables. This is effectively
an additional constraint on the set of possible information structures, and it is of considerable
importance for their conclusions.
10See the discussion in Woodford (2008), in the context of a model with a binary choice.
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Hence the conditional probabilities must be of the form
p(ij|ij) = 1− ei ∀i, j, (1.4)
p(ik|ij) = ei/2 ∀i, j, any k 6= j, (1.5)
where ei is the probability of error in the identification of a letter that appears at
location i.
With this parameterization of the information structure, the mutual information









h(e) ≡ −(1− e) log(1− e)− e log(e/2)
is the entropy of a three-valued random variable with probabilities (1 − e, e/2, e/2)
of the three possible outcomes.11 The optimal information structure subject to con-
straints (1.2)–(1.3) and an upper bound on I will then correspond to the values {ei}
that minimize ∑
i
piiei + θI(e), (1.7)
where I(e) is the function defined in (1.6), and θ ≥ 0 is a Lagrange multiplier as-
sociated with the upper-bound constraint. (Alternatively, if additional information-
processing capacity can be allocated to this task at a cost, θ measures that cost.)
Note that the objective (1.7) is additively separable; this means that for each i,
the optimal value of ei is the one that minimizes
ei − θh(ei),
11The derivation of (1.6) is most easily understood as a calculation of the average amount by which
knowledge of the state ij reduces the entropy of the subjective representation ik. The unconditional
entropy (before knowing the state) of the subjective representation is given by the sum of the first two
terms on the right-hand side, which represent the entropy of the location perception (8 possibilities
with ex ante probabilities {pii}) and the entropy of the letter perception (3 possibilities, equally
likely ex ante) respectively. The final term on the right-hand side subtracts the average value of the
entropy conditional upon the state; the conditional entropy of the location perception is zero (it can
be predicted with certainty), while the conditional entropy of the letter perception is h(ei) if the
location is i.
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regardless of the values chosen for the other locations. Since this function is the
same for all i, the minimizing value e¯ is the same for all i as well. (One can easily
show that the function h(e) is strictly convex, so that the minimum is unique for
any value of θ.) Thus we conclude once again that under this measure of the cost
of more precise awareness, non-uniformity of the location probabilities should not
make it optimal for subjects to make fewer errors at some locations than others. If
the shadow cost of additional processing capacity is assumed to be the same across
the two experiments, then constancy of the value of θ would imply that the value
of e¯ should be the same for each subject in the two experiments. If instead it is
the upper bound on I that is assumed to be the same across the two experiments,
then the reduction in the entropy of the location in the second experiment (because
the probabilities are no longer uniform, there is less uncertainty ex ante about what
the location will be) means that more processing capacity should be available for
transmission of more accurate signals about the identity of the letter, and the value
of e¯ should be substantially lower (the probability of correct identifications should
be higher) in the second experiment. (This prediction is also clearly rejected by the
data of Shaw and Shaw.) But in either case, the probability of correct identification
should be the same across all locations, in the second experiment as much as in the
first, a prediction that is not confirmed by the data.
Why does the mutual information criterion not provide a motive for subjects to
reallocate their attention when the location probabilities are non-uniform? Mutual
information measures the average degree to which the subjective representation re-
duces entropy, weighting each possible representation by the probability with which
it is used. This means that arranging for available representations that will be highly
informative about low-probability states when they occur is not costly, except in
proportion to the probability of occurrence of those states. And while the expected
benefit of being well-informed about low-probability states is small, there remain ben-
efits of being informed about those states — proportional to the probability that the
states will occur. Hence the fact that some states occur with much lower probability
than others does not alter the ratio of cost to benefit of a given level of precision of
the subjective representation of those states.
But this means that theory of rational inattention, as formulated by Sims, cannot
account for reallocation of attention of the kind seen in the experiment of Shaw and
Shaw. We need instead a measure of the cost of more precise awareness that implies
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that it is costly to be able to discriminate between low-probability states (say, an
E as opposed to a T at the 90◦ location), even if one’s capacity to make such a
discrimination is not exercised very frequently.
1.2.3 An Alternative Information-Theoretic Criterion
One possibility is to assume that the information-processing capacity required in or-
der to arrange for a particular stochastic relation {p(r|x)} between the subjective
representation and the true state depends not on the actual amount of information
about the state that is transmitted on average, given the frequency with which differ-
ent states occur, but rather on the potential rate of information transmission by this
system, in the case of any probabilities of occurrence of the states x. Under this alter-
native criterion, it is costly to arrange to have precise awareness of a low-probability
state in the case that it occurs; because even though the state is not expected to
occur very often, a communication channel that can provide such precise awareness
when called upon to do so is one that could transmit information at a substantial
rate, in a world in which the state in question occurred much more frequently. We
may then suppose that the information-processing capacity required to implement
such a stochastic relation will be substantial.
Let the mutual information measure defined in (1.1) be written as I(p; pi), where
p refers to the set of conditional probabilities {p(r|x)} that specify how subjective
representations are related to the actual state, and pi refers to the prior probabili-
ties {pi(x)} with which different states are expected to occur. (The set of possible
subjective representations R is implicit in the specification of p.) Then the pro-
posed measure of the information-processing capacity required to implement a given




This measure of required capacity depends only on the stochastic relation p. I pro-
pose to consider a variant of Sims’s theory of rational inattention, according to which
any stochastic relation p between subjective representations and actual states is pos-
sible, subject to an upper bound on the required information-processing capacity C.
12Note that this is just Shannon’s definition of the capacity of a communication channel that takes
as input the value of x and returns as output the representation r, with conditional probabilities
given by p.
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Alternatively, we may suppose that there is a cost of more precise awareness that is
proportional to the value of C, rather than to the value of I under the particular
probabilities with which different states are expected to be encountered.
Let us consider the implications of this alternative theory for the experiment of
Shaw and Shaw (1977). I shall again suppose that possible information structures
must respect the restrictions (1.2)–(1.3), and shall also again consider only symmet-
ric structures of the form (1.4)–(1.5). Hence the information structure can again be
parameterized by the 8 coefficients {ei}. But instead of assuming that these coeffi-
cients are chosen so as to minimize the expected fraction of incorrect identifications
subject to an upper bound on I, I shall assume that the expected fraction of incorrect
identifications is minimized subject to an upper bound on C. Alternatively, instead
of choosing them to minimize (1.7) for some θ ≥ 0, they will be chosen to minimize∑
i
piiei + θC(e) (1.9)
for some θ ≥ 0, where C(e) is the function defined by (1.8) when the conditional
probabilities p are given by (1.4)–(1.5).
For an information structure of this form, the solution to the optimization problem




for all i. Substituting these probabilities into the definition of mutual information,
we obtain






The first-order conditions for the problem (1.9) are then of the form
pii = θ˜ exp{−h(ei)}h′(ei) (1.10)
for each i, where θ˜ ≡ θ/∑j exp{−h(ej)} will be independent of i. Because the right-
hand side of (1.10) is a monotonically decreasing function of ei, the solution for ei
will vary inveresely with pii. That is, under the optimal information structure, the
probability of a correct identification will be highest at those locations where the
letter is most likely to occur, as in the results of Shaw and Shaw.
Indeed, the proposed theory makes very specific quantitative predictions about the
experiment of Shaw and Shaw. Let us suppose that the shadow value θ of additional
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information-processing capacity remains constant across the two experiments.13 Then
the observed frequencies of correct identification in the case of the uniform location
probabilities can be used to identify the value of θ for each subject. Given this
value, the theory makes a definite prediction about each of the ei in the case of
non-uniform location probabilities. For the parameter values of the Shaw and Shaw
experiment, these theoretical predictions are shown by the circles in each panel of
Figure 2.14 For each of the first three subjects (i.e., the ones with roughly optimal
allocation of attention in the first experiment), the predictions of the theory are
reasonably accurate.15 Hence the reallocation of attention reported by Shaw and
Shaw is reasonably consistent with a version of the theory of rational inattention,
in which the only two constraints on the possible information structure are (i) the
requirement that the subject be aware of the location of the letter, and (ii) an upper
bound on the channel capacity C.
1.3 Visual Adaptation to Variations in Illumination
One of the best-established facts about perception is that the subjective perception
of a given stimulus depends not just on its absolute intensity, but on its intensity
relative to some background or reference level of stimulation, to which the organism
has become accustomed.16 Take the example of the relation between the luminance
of objects in one’s visual field — the intensity of the light emanating from them, as
measured by photometric equipment — and subjective perceptions of their brightness.
We have all experienced being temporarily blinded when stepping from a dark area
13The numerical results shown in Figure 2 are nearly identical in the case that the upper bound
on C is assumed to be constant across the two experiments, rather than the shadow cost θ.
14The value of θ used for each subject is the one that would imply a value of e¯ in the first
experiment equal to the one indicated in Table 1 of Shaw and Shaw (1977).
15They are certainly more accurate than the predictions of the alternative theory according to
which the information structure minimizes (1.7), with the value of θ again constant across the two
experiments. The likelihood ratio in favor of the new theory is greater than 1021 in the case of
the data for subject 1, greater than 1015 for subject 2, and greater than 1030 for subject 3. The
likelihood is instead higher for the first theory in the case of subject 4, but the data for subject 4
are extremely unlikely under either theory. (Under a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test, the p-value
for the new theory is less than 10−14, but it is on the order of 10−11 for the first theory as well.)
16See, e.g., Gabbiani and Cox (2010), chap. 19; Glimcher (2011), chap. 12; Kandel, Schwartz and
Jessel, 2000, chap. 21; or Weber (2004).
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into bright sunlight. At first, visual discrimination is difficult between different (all
unbearably bright) parts of the visual; but one’s eyes quickly “adjust,” and it is soon
possible to see fairly “normally.” Similarly, upon first entering a dark room, it may
be possible to see very little; yet, after one’s eyes adjust to the low illumination, one
finds that different objects in the room can be seen after all. These observations
indicate that one’s ability to discriminate between different levels of luminance is
not fixed; the contrasts between different levels that are perceptible depend on the
mean level of luminance (or perhaps the distribution of levels of luminance in one’s
environment) to which one’s eyes have adapted.
It is also clear that the subjective perception of a given degree of luminance
changes in different environments. The luminance of a given object — say, a white
index card — varies by a factor of 106 between the way it appears on a moonlit night
and in bright sunlight (Gabbiani and Cox, 2010, Figure 19.1). Yet one’s subjective
perception of the brightness of objects seen under different levels of illumination
does not vary nearly so violently. The mapping from objective luminance to the
subjective representation of brightness evidently varies across environments. It is
also not necessarily the same for all parts of one’s visual field at a given point in
time. Looking at a bright light, then turning away from it, results in an after-effect,
in which part of one’s visual field appears darkened for a time. After one has gotten
used to high luminance in that part of the visual field, a more ordinary level of
luminance seems dark — but this is not true of the other parts of one’s visual field,
which have not similarly adjusted. Similarly, a given degree of objective luminance
in different parts of one’s visual field may simultaneously appear brighter or darker,
depending on the degree of luminance of nearby surfaces in each case, giving rise to
a familiar optical illusion.17
Evidence that the sensory effects of given stimuli depend on how they compare
to prior experience need not rely solely on introspection. In the case of non-human
organisms, measurements of electrical activity in the nervous system confirm this, dat-
ing from the classic work of Adrian (1928). For example, Laughlin and Hardie (1978)
graph the response of blowfly and dragonfly photoreceptors to different intensities of
light pulses, when the pulses are delivered against various levels of background lumi-
17For examples, see Frisby and Stone (2010), Figures 1.12, 1.13, 1.14, 16.1, 16.9, and 16.11.
Kahneman (2003) uses an illusion of this kind as an analogy for reference-dependence of economic
valuations.
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Figure 3: Change in membrane potential of the blowfly LMC as a function of contrast
between intensity of a light pulse and the background level of illumination. Solid
line shows the cumulative distribution function for levels of contrast in the visual
environment of the fly. (From Laughlin, 1981.)
nance. The higher the background luminance, the higher the intensity of the pulse
required to produce a given size of response (deflection of the membrane potential).
Laughlin and Hardie point out that the effect of this adaptation is to make the signal
passed on to the next stage of visual processing more a function of contrast (i.e., of
luminance relative to the background level) than of the absolute level of luminance
(p. 336).
An important recent literature argues that the neural coding of stimuli depends
not merely on some average stimulus intensity to which the organism has been ex-
posed, but on the complete probability distribution of stimuli encountered in the or-
ganism’s environment. For example, Laughlin (1981) records the responses (changes
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in membrane potential) of the large monopolar cell (LMC) in the compound eye of the
blowfly to pulses of light that are either brighter or darker than the background level
of illumination to varying extents. His experimental data are shown in Figure 3 by
the black dots with whiskers. The change in the cell membrane potential in response
to the pulse is shown on the vertical axis, with the maximum increase normalized
as +1 and the maximum decrease as -1.18 The intensity of the pulse is plotted on
the horizontal axis in terms of contrast,19 as Laughlin and Hardie (1978) had already
established that the LMC responds to contrast rather than to the absolute level of
luminance.
Laughlin also plots an empirical frequency distribution for levels of contrast in
the visual environment of the blowflies in question. The cumulative distribution
function (cdf) is shown by the solid line in the figure.20 Laughlin notes the similarity
between the graph of the cdf and the graph of the change in membrane potential.
They are not quite identical; but one sees that the potential increases most rapidly
— allowing sharper discrimination between nearby levels of luminance — over the
range of contrast levels that occur most frequently in the natural environment, so
that the cdf is also rapidly increasing.21 Thus Laughlin proposes not merely that
the visual system of the fly responds to contrast rather than to the absolute level of
luminance, but that the degree of response to a given variation in contrast depends
on the degree of variation in contrast found in the organism’s environment. This, he
suggests, represents an efficient use of the LMC’s limited range of possible responses:
it “us[es] the response range for the better resolution of common events, rather than
reserving large portions for the improbable” (p. 911).
The adaptation to the statistics of the natural environment suggested by Laughlin
might be assumed to have resulted from evolutionary selection or early development,
18For each level of contrast, the whiskers indicate the range of experimental measurements of the
response, while the dot shows the mean response.
19This is defined as (I − I0)/(I + I0), where I is the stimulus luminance and I0 is the background
luminance. Thus contrast is a monotonic function of relative luminance, where 0 means no difference
from the background level of illumination, +1 is the limiting case of infinitely greater luminance
than the background, and -1 is the limiting case of a completely dark image.
20The cdf is plotted after a linear transformation so that it varies from -1 to +1 rather than from
0 to 1.
21It is worth recalling that the probability density function (pdf) is the derivative of the cdf. Thus
a more rapid increase in the cdf means that the pdf is higher for that level of contrast.
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and not to be modified by an individual organism’s subsequent experience. However,
other studies find evidence of adaptation of neural coding to statistical properties of
the environment that occurs fairly rapidly. For example, Brenner et al. (2000) find
that a motion-sensitive neuron of the blowfly responds not simply to motion relative
to a background rate of motion, but to the difference between the rate of motion
and the background rate, rescaled by dividing by a local (time-varying) estimate of
the standard deviation of the stimulus variability. Other studies find that changes in
the statistics of inputs change the structure of retinal receptive fields in predictable
ways.22
These studies all suggest that the way in which stimuli are coded can change
with changes in the distribution of stimuli to which a sensory system has become
habituated. But can such adaptation be understood as the solution to an optimization
problem? The key to this is a correct understanding of the relevant constraints on
the processing of sensory information.
1.4 Adaptation as Optimal Coding
Let us suppose that the frequency distribution of degrees of luminance in a given envi-
ronment is log-normally distributed; that is, log luminance is distributed as N(µ, σ2)
for some parameters µ, σ.23 We wish to consider the optimal design of a perceptual
system, in which a subjective perception (or neural representation) of brightness r
will occur with conditional probability p(r|x) when the level of log luminance is x.
By optimality I mean that the representation is as accurate as possible, on average,
subject to a constraint on the information-processing requirement of the system.
Let us suppose further that the relevant criterion for accuracy is minimization
of the mean squared error of an estimate xˆ(r) of the log luminance based on the
subjective perception r.24
22See Dayan and Abbott (2001), chap. 4; Fairhall (2007); or Rieke et al. (1997), chap. 5, for
reviews of this literature.
23The histograms shown in Figure 19.4 of Gabbiani and Cox (2010) for the distribution of lumi-
nance in natural scenes suggest that this is not an unreasonable approximation.
24Our criteria for the accuracy of perceptions would be possible, of course. This one has the
consequence that, under any of the possible formulations of the constraint on the information content
of subjective representations considered below, the optimal information structure will conform to
Weber’s Law, in the formulation given by Thurstone (1959) cited above in section 1.1. That is,
for any threshold 0 < p < 1, the probability that a given stimulus S will be judged brighter than
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Note that it is important to distinguish between the subjective perception r and
the estimate of the luminance that one should make, given awareness of r. For
one thing, r need not itself be assumed to be commensurable with luminance (it
need not be a real number, or measured in the same units), so that it may not be
possible to speak of the closeness of the representation r itself to the true state x.
But more importantly, I do not wish to identify the subjective representation r with
the optimal inference that should be made from it, because the mapping from r to
xˆ(r) should change when the prior and/or the coding system changes. Experiments
that measure electrical potentials in the nervous system associated with particular
stimuli, like those discussed above, are documenting the relationship between x and r,
rather than between x and an optimal estimate of x. Similarly, the observation that
the subjective perception of the brightness of objects in different parts of the visual
field can be different depending on the luminance of nearby objects in each region is
an observation about the context-dependence of the mapping from x to r, and not
direct evidence about how an optimal estimate of luminance in different parts of the
visual field should be formed. (That is, I shall interpret the subjective experience
of brightness as reflecting the current value of r, the neural coding of the stimulus,
rather than an inference xˆ(r).)
The solution to this optimization problem depends on the kind of constraint on
information-processing capacity one assumes. Suppose, for example, that we assume
an upper bound on the number of distinct representations r that may be used, and
no other constraints, as in Gul et al. (2011). In this case, it is easily shown that
an optimal information structure partitions the real line into a N intervals (each
representing a range of possible levels of luminance), each of which is assigned a
distinct subjective representation r. The optimal choice of the boundaries for these
intervals is a classic problem in the theory of optimal coding; the solution is given by
the algorithm of Lloyd and Max (Sayood, 2005, chap. 9).
This sort of information structure does not, however, closely resemble actual per-
ceptual processes. It implies that while varying levels of luminance over some range
should be completely indistinguishable from one another, it should be possible to find
a stimulus with the mean level of luminance will be less than p if and only if the luminance of S
is less than some multiple of the mean luminance, where the multiple depends on p and σ, but is
independent of µ — i.e., independent of the mean level of luminance to which the perceptual system
is adapted.
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two levels of luminance x1, x2 that differ only infinitesimally, and yet are perfectly
discriminable from one another (because they happen to lie on opposite sides of a
boundary between two intervals that are mapped to different subjective represen-
tations). This sort of discontinuity is, of course, never found in psychophysical or
neurological studies.
If we instead assume an upper bound I on the mutual information between the
state x and the representation r, in accordance with the “rational inattention” hy-
pothesis of Sims, this is another problem with a well-known solution (Sims, 2011).
One possible representation of the optimal information structure is to suppose that
the subjective perception is a real number, equal to the true state plus an observation
error,
r = x+ , (1.11)







Thus the signal-to-noise ratio of the noisy percept is an increasing function of the
bound I, falling to zero as I approaches zero, and growing without bound as I is
made unboundedly large.
In this model of imperfect perception, there is no problem of discontinuity: the
probability that the subjective representation will belong to any subset of the set R
of possible representations is now a continuous function of x. But this model fails to
match the experimental evidence in other respects. Note that the optimal information
structure (1.11) is independent of the value of µ. Thus the model implies that the
discriminability of two possible levels of luminance x1, x2 should be independent of the
mean level of luminance in the environment to which the visual system has adapted;
but in that case there should be no difficulty in seeing when abruptly moving to
an environment with a markedly different level of illumination. Similarly, it implies
that the degree of discriminability of x1 and x2 should depend only on the distance
|x1 − x2|, and not on where x1 and x2 are located in the frequency distribution of
luminance levels. But this is contrary to the observation of Laughlin (1981) that finer
discriminations are made among the range of levels of illumination that occur more
frequently.
Moreover, according to this model, there is no advantage to responding to contrast
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rather than to the absolute level of illumination: a subjective representation of the
form (1.11), which depends on the absolute level of illumination x and not on contrast
x˜, is fully optimal.25 This leaves it a mystery why response to contrast is such an ubiq-
uitous feature of perceptual systems. Moreover, since the model implies that there
should be no need to recalibrate the mapping of objective levels of luminance into
subjective perceptions when the mean level of luminance in the environment changes,
it provides no explanation for the existence of after-effects or lightness illusions.
The problem with the mutual information criterion seems, once again, to be the
fact that there is no penalty for making fine discriminations among states that seldom
occur: such discriminations make a small contribution to mutual information as long
as they are infrequently used. Thus the information structure (1.11) involves not only
an extremely large set of different possible subjective representations (one with the
cardinality of the continuum), but nearly all of them (all r << µ and all r >> µ) are
subjective representations that are mainly used to distinguish among different states
that are far out in the tails of the frequency distribution. As a consequence, the
observation of Laughlin (1981) that it would be inefficient for neural coding to leave
“large parts of the response range [of a neuron] underutilized because they correspond
to exceptionally large excursions of input” (p. 910) is completely inconsistent with
the cost of information precision assumed in RI theory.
As in the previous section, the alternative hypothesis of an upper bound on the
capacity requirement C defined in (1.8) leads to predictions more similar to the ex-
perimental evidence. The type of information structure that minimizes mean squared
error subject to an upper bound on C involves only a finite number of distinct subjec-
tive representations r, which are used more to distinguish among states in the center
of the frequency distribution than among states in the tails. Figure 4 gives, as an
example, the optimal information structure in the case that the upper bound on C
25It is true that the representation given in (1.11) is not uniquely optimal; one could also have
many other optimal subjective representations, including one in which r = x˜ + , so that the
representation depends only on contrast. The reason is that Sims’ theory does not actually determine
the representations r at all, only the degree to which the distributions p(r|x) for different states x
overlap one another. However, the theory provides no reason for the representation of contrast to be a
superior approach. Furthermore, if one adds to the basic theory of rational inattention a supposition
that there is even a tiny cost of having to code stimuli differently in different environments, as surely
there should be, then the indeterminacy is broken, and the representation (1.11) is found to be
uniquely optimal.
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Figure 4: Optimal information structures for a capacity limit C equal to one-half
a binary digit, when the prior distribution is N(µ, 1). Plots show the probability of
each of three possible subjective representations, conditional on the true state. Panel
(a): µ = −2. Panel (b): µ = +2.
is equal to only one-half of a binary digit.26 In this case, the optimal information
structure involves three distinct possible subjective representations (labeled 1, 2, and
3), which one may think of as subjective perceptions of the scene as “dark,” “mod-
erately illuminated,” and “bright” respectively. The lines in the figure indicate the
conditional probability of the scene being perceived in each of these three ways, as a
function of the objective log luminance x.27
These numerical results indicate that with a finite upper bound on C, the per-
26If the logarithm in (1.1) is a natural logarithm, then this corresponds to a numerical value
C = 0.5 log 2. For those readers who may have difficulty imagining “half of a binary digit”: a
communication channel with this capacity can transmit the same amount of information, on average,
in each two transmissions as can be transmitted in each individual transmission using a channel which
can send the answer to one yes/no question with perfect precision.
27The equations that are solved to plot these curves are stated in section 2, and the numerical
algorithm used to solve them is discussed in the Appendix.
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Figure 5: Predicted “psychometric functions” for a two-alternative forced choice task,
in which a stimulus B of log luminance µ+zσ is compared to a stimulus A of standard
log luminance µ. The vertical axis plots the probability that a subject should report
that B is brighter than A, as a function of z, for each of several possible limits on
information processing capacity C (in bits per observation).
ception of a given stimulus will be stochastic. However, the frequency distribution
of subjective representations will differ more the greater the objective dissimilarity
of two stimuli. For example, Figure 5 shows the probability that a subject should
perceive a second stimulus B to be brighter than a first stimulus A,28 if the objective
log luminance of A is µ (the mean level in a given environment) while that of B is
µ + zσ (i.e., it exceeds the mean log luminance by z standard deviations).29 The
28In calculating the probabilities plotted in the figure, it is assumed that if the subjective repre-
sentations of the two stimuli are identical, there will be a 50 percent probability of judging either
to be the brighter of the two. A “two-alternative forced choice” experiment is assumed, in which a
subject must announce that one of the two stimuli is brighter than the other.
29With this measure of the relative luminance of B, the predicted psychometric functions are
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response probability is plotted as a function of z, for each of several possible values
of C. For each finite value of C, the theory predicts a continuous “psychometric
function” of the kind that is commonly fit to experimental data. The function rises
more steeply around z = 0, however, the larger the value of C. (In the limit as C is
made unboundedly large, the probability approaches zero for all z < 0 and one for
all z > 0, as discrimination becomes arbitrarily precise.)
The theory also implies that the probability that a given stimulus will be perceived
as “bright” should depend on the frequency distribution of levels of brightness to
which the subject’s visual system has adapted. In panel (a) of Figure 4, the prior
distribution has a mean of 2 and a standard deviation of 1, while in panel (b),
the mean is −2 and the standard deviation is again equal to 1. One observes that
the shift in the mean luminance between the two cases shifts the functions that
indicate the conditional probabilities. In the high-average-luminance environment,
a log luminance of zero has a high probability of being perceived as “dark” and
only a negligible probability of being perceived as “bright,” while in the low-average-
luminance environment, the same stimulus has a high probability of being perceived
as “bright” and only a negligible probability of being perceived as “dark.” Thus the
theory predicts that perceptions of brightness are recalibrated depending on the mean
luminance of the environment. In fact, the figure shows that for a fixed value of σ,
subjective perceptions of brightness are predicted to be functions only of contrast,
x−µ, rather than of the absolute level of luminance.30 Hence the theory is consistent
both with the observed character of neural coding and with subjective experiences of
after-effects and lightness illusions.
The theory also predicts that finer discriminations will be made among levels of
luminance that occur more frequently, in the environment to which the perceptual
system has adapted. One way to discuss the degree of discriminability of nearby








independent of the values of µ and σ, as discussed further below.
30It follows that the degree of contrast x−µ required for a given probability p of perception of B
as brighter is independent of µ. Since x and µ measure log luminance, this means that the required
percentage difference in the objective luminances of A and B is independent of µ, in accordance
with Thurstone’s (1959) formulation of Weber’s Law, cited above.
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Figure 6: Fisher information IFisher(x) measuring the discriminability of each ob-
jective state x from nearby states under optimal information structures. Solid line
corresponds to the optimal structure subject to a limit on the capacity C, dashed line
to the optimal structure subject to a limit on mutual information. The two panels
correspond to the same two prior distributions as in Figure 4.
as a function of the objective state x, where the sum is over all possible subjective
representations r in the case of that state.31 This function is shown in the two panels
of Figure 6, for the two information structures shown in the corresponding panels of
Figure 4. In each panel, the solid line plots the Fisher information for the information
structure shown in Figure 4 (the optimal structure subject to an upper bound on C),
while the dashed line plots the Fisher information for the optimal information struc-
ture in the case of the same prior distribution, but where the structure is optimized
subject to an upper bound on the mutual information I (also equal to one-half a
binary digit).
As discussed above, when the relevant constraint is the mutual information (Sims’s
31For the interpretation of this as a measure of the discriminability of nearby states in the neigh-
borhood of a given state x, see, e.g., Cox and Hinkley (1974).
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RI hypothesis), the optimal structure discriminates equally well among nearby levels
of luminance over the entire range of possible levels: in fact, IFisher(x) is constant
in this case. In the theory proposed here instead (an upper bound on C), the opti-
mal information structure implies a greater ability to discriminate among alternative
states within an interval concentrated around the mean level of log luminance µ, but
almost no ability to discriminate among alternative levels of luminance when these
are either all more than one standard deviation below the mean, or all more than one
standard deviation above the mean. Hence the theory predicts that someone moving
from one of these two environments to the other should have very poor vision, until
their visual system adapts to the new environment. The theory is also reasonably
consistent with Laughlin’s (1981) observations about the visual system of the fly:
not only that only contrast is perceived, but that sharper discriminations are made
among nearby levels of contrast in the case of those levels of contrast that occur most
frequently in the environment.
Both this application and the one in the previous section, then, suggest that the
hypothesis of an optimal information structure subject to an upper bound on the
channel capacity C required to implement it can explain at least some important
experimental findings with regard to the nature of visual perception. Since the hy-
pothesis formulated in this way is of a very general character, and not dependent on
special features of the particular problems in visual perception discussed above, it
may be reasonable to conjecture that the same principle should explain the character
of perceptual limitations in other domains as well.
2 A Model of Inattentive Valuation
I now wish to consider the implications of the theory of partial awareness proposed
in the previous section for the specific context of economic choice. I shall consider
the hypothesis that economic decisionmakers, when evaluating the options available
to them in a situation requiring them to make a choice, are only partially aware of
the characteristics of each of the options. But I shall give precise content to this
hypothesis by supposing that the particular imprecise awareness that they have of
each of their options represents an optimal allocation of their scarce information-
processing capacity. The specific constraint that this imposes on possible relations
between subjective valuations and the objective characteristics of the available options
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is modeled in a way that has been found to explain at least certain features of visual
perception, as discussed in the previous section.
2.1 Formulation of the Problem
As an example of the implications of this theory, let us suppose that a DM must
evaluate various options x, each of which is characterized by a value xa for each of
n distinct attributes. I shall suppose that each of the n attributes must be observed
separately, and that it is the capacity required to process these separate observations
that represents the crucial bottleneck that results in less than full awareness of the
characteristics of the options. As a consequence, the subjective representation of
each option will also have n components {ra}, though some of these may be null
representations — in the sense that the value of component ra for some a may be the
same for all options, so that there is no awareness of differences among the options
on this attribute. The DM’s partial awareness can then be specified by a collection
of conditional probabilities {pa(ra|xa)} for a = 1, . . . , n. Here it is assumed that
the probability of obtaining a particular subjective representation ra of attribute a
depends only on the true value xa of this particular attribute; this is the meaning of
the assumption of independent observations of the distinct attributes.32
The additional constraint that I shall assume on possible information structures
is an upper bound on the required channel capacity (1.8). Because of the assumed
decomposability of the information structure into separate signals about each of the
attributes a, the solution for the optimal prior probabilities pi∗ in problem (1.8) can





which depends only on the type of signal that is obtained about attribute a. (This
follows from the standard result that the total capacity, in Shannon’s sense, of a set
of n independent communication channels that can be operated in parallel is equal
to the sum of the capacities of the individual channels.)
32As discussed in the previous section, additional constraints of this kind on the set of possible
information structures are necessary in order for there to be any possibility of understanding actual
perceptual systems as optimal subject to an information-processing constraint.
34
The total capacity C is then just the sum
∑
aCa, where Ca is the maximized
value of problem (2.1). I shall suppose that there is an upper bound on the possible
capacity C that can be used to evaluate options of this kind, or alternatively that
additional processing capacity C can be allocated to this task only at some positive
unit cost θ. In either case, the shadow cost of allocating additional capacity Ca to the
evaluation of attribute a will have to be the same for all attributes, and this is what
makes it possible to draw conclusions about the relative amount of attention that
will be paid to different attributes by the DM. It is simplest to consider the case in
which there is also a common shadow cost of additional processing capacity for other
tasks about which the same DM is concerned, and that this cost θ is little affected
by variations in the amount of capacity allocated to awareness of the particular kind
of options under consideration. In this case, the value of θ can be taken as given in
solving for the optimal degree of partial awareness of the options in this particular
decision problem.
Finally, I shall suppose that the DM values options according to the sum u =∑
a xa of their values along the various dimensions. (I assume that the measures of the
various attributes have been scaled so that a unit increase in any attribute increases
the DM’s utility by an equal amount; this is purely a notational convenience.33) And
I shall assume that the information structure is optimal in the sense of minimizing
the mean squared error of the DM’s estimate uˆ of the value of the option, where uˆ is
the optimal estimate of u given the subjective representation r.
The mean squared error associated with an estimate uˆ(r) can be defined only
using a particular prior probability distribution pi(x) over the possible objective char-
acteristics x of the options that the DM may encounter. Hence optimality can only be
relative to a particular prior distribution, to which a particular information structure
(described by the conditional probabilities p(r|x)) may be better or worse adapted.
My goal here is to derive implications of the hypothesis of optimal adaptation of the
information structure to a particular prior; I shall not seek to provide a theory of how
33The assumption of additive separability of utility in the different attributes is instead an im-
portant restriction, here adopted for the sake of simplicity. The assumption of linearity is not in
itself a restriction, as we may suppose that the value of the attribute is subject to a nonlinear trans-
formation that makes utility linear in the transformed value. Linearity only becomes a restriction
in conjunction with the further assumption that the prior probability distribution of values for xa
is Gaussian: I am then assuming Gaussianity of the distribution of transformed values, after the
transformation required to make utility linear in xa.
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the prior should be determined. A standard assumption in economic models of choice
under imperfect information, of course, is that the prior coincides with the objective
probabilities with which different options may be encountered by the DM. The prior
may be interpreted that way here, as well; but the conclusions derived would equally
follow in the case of a subjective prior that does not necessarily coincide with any
objective probabilities.34
The characterization of the optimal estimate is simplest in the case that the prior
assumes that the value of each attribute is distributed independently of the others.
Then the optimal estimate xˆa of each attribute is a function only of component ra of
the subjective representation, and the mean squared error of the estimate uˆ =
∑
a xˆa
is just the sum of the mean squared errors of the component estimates xˆa. We can then
solve separately for the optimal information structure pa(ra|xa) for a given attribute,
as the one that minimizes the mean squared error of the optimal estimate xˆa(ra), given
the (marginal) prior distribution pia over possible values of xa, for a given processing
capacity Ca allocated to the perception of this attribute. The value of Ca depends
only on the information structure chosen for the perception of attribute a. If the
shadow cost θ of additional capacity is given independently of the total capacity C
used to evaluate the option, then it is possible to solve for the optimal information
structure for an individual attribute a, without any reference to the information
structures chosen for the other attributes.
The optimal information structure for any attribute can be defined as the choice
of a set of possible representations R, conditional probabilities p(r|x) for each possible




(x− xˆ)2] , (2.2)
subject to an upper bound on the required channel capacity C defined in (1.8).
34There is a certain amount of experimental evidence indicating that it is possible to manipu-
late the choices of experimental subjects among options with unchanged objective characteristics,
simply by providing additional options (that are not chosen), or directing the subject’s attention
to particular possibilities in other ways. I would propose to interpret these findings as examples of
manipulation of the subject’s prior by changes in the experimental setting; these changes do not
always involve the provision of objectively relevant information.
35Here I omit the subscripts a associated with the particular attribute under consideration. More
precisely, one should refer to a set Ra, conditional probabilities pa(ra|xa), and an estimation rule
xˆa(ra).
36
(Here the expectation E[·] means an integral using the joint distribution for (r, x)
implied by the prior pi(x) for the objective states and the conditional probabilities
p(r|x).) The notation used here assumes that the estimate xˆ is a deterministic function
of the representation r, and one can show that this is optimal. One also easily
sees that the identity of the representations R is irrelevant to the solution: it only
matters how many different representations belong to the set, and the extent to which
the probability distributions over representations associated with different objective
states x are similar or different. Hence one can equivalently state the problem in
terms of a direct choice of conditional probabilities p(xˆ|x) of different estimates xˆ
of the value of the attribute. In this case, the required channel capacity C is the
maximum value of the mutual information between x and xˆ, where the maximization
is again over all possible prior distributions {pi(x)}.
I show in the Appendix that this problem is equivalent to the choice of a measure
px = p(·|x) over the set of possible estimates xˆ for each objective state x, and another
measure q over that same set of possible estimates that is independent of the objective
state, so as to minimize (2.2) subject to the constraint that
D(px||q) ≤ C (2.3)
for each possible state x.36 Here the expectation E[·] in (2.2) is an integral using
the joint distribution over values (xˆ, x) implied by the prior pi(x) and the conditional







is the relative entropy (or Kullback-Leibler divergence) between the two measures,
in which expression Ep[·] denotes an integral using the measure p over the possible
values of xˆ. The relative entropy is only defined in the case that px is absolutely
continuous with respect to the measure q; this means that px cannot assign positive
probability to any events that have zero probability under q. Constraint (2.3) thus
assumes that the measure px has this property for each possible state x.
Here the measure q is not part of the definition of the information structure —
that is fully specified by the conditional probabilities {px} — but only a convenient
36More precisely, the problem is to choose a joint distribution of possible values (xˆ, x) with
marginal distribution corresponding to the prior pi(x), subject to a constraint that (2.3) hold almost
surely (i.e., for values of x that occur with probability 1 under the prior).
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mathematical representation of the constraint upon possible choices of the {px}. The
collection of measures px for different objective states x must all be such that they
satisfy a bound of the form (2.3) for some common measure q. The optimal choice of q
in the mathematical problem stated above is the one that relaxes the constraints (2.3)
in the way that is most helpful in allowing the mean squared error of the estimate xˆ
to be reduced.
The relative entropy is a measure of how different the probability distribution px
is from the “typical” probabilities q of occurrence of the various representations (or
estimates).37 The complexity of the signal that must be sent from one’s senses (or
more generally, from earlier stages of processing of information about this feature of
one’s situation) in state x is greater the more different the distribution of subjective
representations is required to be in state x than what it typically is. The constraint
(2.3) indicates that under this conception of the cost of information processing, the
available capacity C constrains how different the distribution of subjective represen-
tations associated with any particular state can be from the “typical” distribution.
Under the Sims version of RI, instead, the corresponding constraint can be writ-
ten38
E[D(px||q)] ≤ C, (2.4)
where the expectation E[·] integrates over possible values of x using the prior pi(x).
According to that theory, processing capacity constrains only the average complexity
of the signal that may be sent about the environment to later stages of processing;
sending highly complex signals (to produce subjective representations quite unlike
the typical ones) is not a problem as long as the states in which they are sent occur
with sufficiently low frequency. Under the theory proposed here, instead, processing
capacity limits the degree to which subjective representations can differ in any state.
The capacity Ca allocated to the DM’s awareness of a given attribute a is itself
assumed to represent an optimal allocation of some total processing capacity. Hence
in deriving the optimal information structure for a given attribute, C should also be
37Note that the relative entropy is necessarily non-negative, and equal to zero only if the two
distributions are identical (almost surely). For further discussion, see e.g., Cover and Thomas
(2006).
38This is equivalent to a requirement that the conditional probabilities {px} be chosen so that
I ≤ C, where I is the mutual information defined in (1.1). Note that the measure q that minimizes
E[D(px||q)] is p ≡ Epx, and that E[D(px||p)] = I.
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chosen, along with q and the {px}, so as to minimize
E
[
(x− xˆ)2]+ θC (2.5)
for some unit cost of capacity θ > 0, subject to the constraint that (2.3) hold for all
x. The value of θ may either be taken as externally given, or may be solved for so as
to imply capacity demands {Ca} for the several attributes that sum to some given
total capacity available for evaluation of this type of option.
2.2 Optimal Information Structures
Even when x (the value of a particular attribute) is a continuous variable and the
prior is described by a density function pi(x), the solution to the above problem
will generally involve only a discrete set of possible subjective representations, and a
corresponding discrete set of possible estimates {xˆi}, where i indexes the particular
subjective representation of the attribute. The measure q is correspondingly a dis-
crete measure (that can be specified by a set of probabilities {qi}), and the optimal
information structure is given by a set of functions {pi(x)}, where pi(x) indicates the
probability of observing subjective representation i (and hence of making estimate
xˆi) when the objective state is x. We may assume without loss of generality that
qi > 0 for all i, since the absolute continuity requirement implies that the function
pi(x) would have to equal zero (almost surely) in the case of any representation i
with a zero probability under the measure q. The functions pi(x) take values between
zero and one for all x, and satisfy
∑
i pi(x) = 1 for all x. Figure 4 above presents
an example of an optimal information structure, for a case in which the prior pi(x) is
Gaussian, and θ is large enough for the optimal allocation of processing capacity to
this attribute to be only one-half a binary digit per observation.39
As shown in the Appendix, an optimal information structure is characterized by
a system of equations of the following form. For each objective state x, let Iˆ(x) be
the subset of the discrete set of possible representations I) for which the squared
error |xˆi− x|2 implied by the representation is minimized. (Typically, there will be a
single minimum-distortion representation, but for certain special states x, there will
39That is, Ca = 0.5 log 2. Given that the standard deviation σa is equal to 1 in the figure, this
corresponds to a value θ = 0.997, using the result from Table 1 below.
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be the total probability of occurrence of representations in the minimum-distortion
set for state x, under the measure q. Then for any state x such that
qˆ(x) ≥ e−C , (2.6)
it is possible to find a measure px over the set I with a support contained in Iˆ(x)
that satisfies (2.3). In this case, the constraint (2.3) does not bind, and pi(x) = 0 for
any representation x /∈ Iˆ(x): only minimum-distortion representations ever occur in
this state. If Iˆ(x) consists of a single representation ıˆ(x),40 then pıˆ(x)(x) = 1. More
generally, px will be some measure with support on the discrete set Iˆ(x) that satisfies
the bound (2.3).41
When (2.6) does not hold,42 constraint (2.3) binds, and the probability of occur-
rence of each possible subjective representation i will be given by
pi(x) =
qi exp{−θ(x)−1|x− xˆi|2}∑
j qj exp{−θ(x)−1|x− xˆj|2}
, (2.7)
where θ(x) ≥ 0 is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (2.3) for that
state x. This implies that there is at least some probability of occurrence of every
possible subjective representation, in the case of each objective state x. However,
those representations that lead to a more accurate estimate of the state are relatively
more likely to occur.
In particular, if the state x is a single real variable (as in the examples plotted
in Figure 4), then (2.7) implies that for any pair of representations i, j, and any two














40Note that this is the generic case.
41Except when (2.6) holds with equality, the solution for px is indeterminate in this case.
42Often, the condition does not hold for any x; this is true of the various numerical examples
discussed in this paper. Condition (2.6) cannot hold unless the measure q assigns a sufficiently large
probability to the small number of representations (generally only one) that are closest to the true
state x, while at the same time C must be a sufficiently large positive quantity. But if C is not small,
an optimal information structure will allow for many different representations, and the measure q
will not assign too much probability to any one of them.
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where x¯i,j ≡ (xˆi + xˆj)/2 is the mean of the estimates implied by the two representa-
tions. If the shadow value of relaxing the constraint (2.3) is the same for both states,
then representation i will have a greater relative likelihood of occurrence in the case
of state x if and only if the sign of x−y is the same as the sign of xˆi− xˆj (a monotone
likelihood ratio property). But even if xˆi > xˆj while x < y, it is possible for represen-
tation i to be relatively more likely in the case of state x, if both x and y exceed x¯i,j
(so that i is the more accurate representation of either state) and θ(y) > θ(x) to a
sufficient extent (so that the capacity constraint prevents sharp discriminations from
being made as to which subjective state will arise, to a greater extent in the case of
state y), or if instead both x and y are less than x¯i,j and θ(x) > θ(y) (so that j is
more accurate for both states, and less sharp discriminations are made in state x).
Given the state-independent probabilities qi and the estimates xˆi associated with
the various subjective representations i ∈ I, the value of θ(x) can be determined for
any state x for which (2.6) does not hold, by increasing the assumed value of θ until
the measure px defined by (2.7) satisfies (2.3) with equality.
43 In this way, assumed
values {qi} and {xˆi} give rise to uniquely defined44 conditional probabilities {pi(x)}
and a Lagrange multiplier θ(x) for each objective state x.






for each possible representation i. (This expression is well-defined and positive for
each i, as long as (2.6) is violated for some set of states with positive measure under
the prior pi(x). If this is not the case, the measure q is undefined, but is not needed
to describe the optimal information structure, since (2.7) applies at most to a set
of states assigned measure zero under the prior.) Thus the measure q indicates the
overall frequency of occurrence of the various subjective representations, if the weights
43The geometry of this is illustrated in the Appendix.
44This is subject to the qualification that the measure px is indeterminate in the case that (2.6)
holds as a strict inequality and there is more than one element in the set Iˆ(x). Note that the
indeterminacy of px in this case does not affect the calculation of q in (2.8). Nor does it matter for
the calculation of the {xˆi} in (2.9), unless the set of x for which px is indeterminate is of positive
measure under the prior. In the relatively special case that the prior pi(x) assigns an atom to a value
x that is equidistant from two or more of the estimates {xˆi}, then the indeterminacy of the measure
px is resolved precisely by the requirement that (2.9) yield estimates for the representations i ∈ Iˆ(x)
with the property that x is equidistant from them.
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placed on the various possible objective states are given by the prior pi(x) adjusted
by a factor θ(x) reflecting the value of additional capacity in that state.
Finally, for each subjective representation i, the estimate xˆi is just the optimal
(minimum mean-squared-error) estimate of x when representation i is observed, if a






for each possible representation i. (These conditional expectations will be well-defined
for each i, as long as i occurs with positive probability under the prior pi(x).)
The optimal information structure for any capacity constraint C is therefore given
by a measure q and estimates {xˆi} that imply conditional expectations {pi(x)} and
multipliers θ(x) for all x in the support of pi(x), such that (2.8) and (2.9) yield
precisely this measure and these estimates.45 Associated with this solution will be a




If we wish to solve for the optimal information structure for a given attribute a,
taking as given not the capacity Ca allocated to processing information about that
attribute, but rather the shadow value θ of additional capacity, which is equalized
across all attributes under an optimal allocation of attention across attributes, this
can be done by varying the assumed value of Ca in the constraints (2.3) until the
solution for the multipliers {θ(x)} implies the desired value of θ when substituted
into (2.10).
When C is chosen endogenously, the optimal value may or may not be positive.
As C is reduced to zero, the implied value of θ may well remain finite. For example,
in the case of a Gaussian prior N(µ, σ2), the upper bound on θ is given by 1.32σ2, as
shown in Table 1 below. This means that there are finite shadow values of processing
capacity for which it will be optimal to pay no attention at all to a given attribute.
The optimal information structure involves measures px which are independent of x,
and hence convey no information, and as a consequence the optimal action will be
independent of the signal received about this attribute. One may then without loss
45The numerical algorithm used to solve these equations in the numerical examples presented in
the paper is discussed in the Appendix.
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of generality assume that there is a single representation that is the same at all times
— which is the same as saying, there is no representation of this attribute at all.
2.3 Effects of the Prior on Discriminations of Value
A key implication of the theory just proposed is that the probability of occurrence
of different subjective representations, and hence of different estimates of the value
of the various attributes of a given option, depend not only on the objective values
of those attributes, but also upon the prior distribution for each of the attributes,
for which the DM’s perceptual system has been optimized. This implies an essential
reference-dependence of perceptions of value, though the importance of the reference-
dependence (in terms of the degree to which it alters the choices that the DM will
make) will be greatest when the processing capacity allocated to the perception of a
particular attribute is small.
Here I illustrate the way in which changes in the prior change the predicted nature
of the discriminations that should be made among options that differ in a particular
attribute, through examples of numerical solutions of the equations stated above. In
these examples, I shall assume that the attribute can be measured by a single real
variable x, and I shall assume that the prior pi(x) is a Gaussian distribution with
mean µ and standard deviation σ > 0. The optimal information structures for priors
within this family have an important invariance property. For a fixed value of the
bound C on processing capacity, the number of distinct subjective representations
in the set I is independent of µ and σ. Moreover, the conditional probability of
occurrence of each subjective representation i is of the form pi((x−µ)/σ), where the
function pi(z) is independent of µ and σ, when written in terms of the normalized
state (i.e., the number of standard deviations by which the state x differs from the
prior mean). This invariance is illustrated in Figure 4, where the effect of a shift in
µ is simply a horizontal translation of the graphs of each of the functions {pi(x)}.
(It is also assumed in Figure 5, where the probability of recognition of stimulus B as
brighter is plotted as a function of z rather than of x.)
The optimal estimate of the state xˆi associated with a given subjective represen-
tation will be of the form
xˆi = µ+ σzˆi,
where zˆi (the estimated value of the normalized state) will be independent of µ and
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will be of the form
E[xˆ|x] = µ+ σφ((x− µ)/σ),
where the function
φ(z) ≡ E[zˆ|z] (2.11)
is independent of both µ and σ, for a given value of C.46
The shadow value θ of additional capacity will also be independent of µ, though
it does depend on σ; specifically, when C is held fixed, the value of θ will grow in
proportion to σ2. Hence if the cost of capacity θ is given and C is endogenously deter-
mined, the optimal capacity C will be a decreasing function of θ/σ2, or alternatively,
an increasing function of σ2/θ, but independent of µ. This inverse relationship is il-
lustrated for various illustrative values of C in Table 1. Note that the optimal value
of C falls to zero, and the function φ(z) becomes a constant function, equal to zero
for all z, for all values of θ/σ2 above a finite critical value, approximately equal to
1.32.
In order to further illustrate the consequences of variations in the prior for the
stochastic subjective representation of value, it may be useful to present additional
numerical computations for the case of an information structure with C = 0.5 bits
(binary digits), shown in Figure 4. In this case, the optimal information structure
involves three possible subjective representations, as discussed earlier, and can be
completely specified by a single function p(z), in terms of which the the conditional
probabilities of the three representations are
p1(z) = p(−z),
p2(z) = 1− p(z)− p(−z),
p3(z) = p(z).
46This function is plotted in Figure 8 below.
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Table 1: The relation between optimal capacity C and the cost of capacity θ, in the
case of a Gaussian prior. The value of φ(1) measures the average slope of the graph
of mean subjective value as a function of objective value, over the range of objective
values ±1 standard deviation around the mean.
The optimal estimates in the case of each subjective representation are similarly of
the form
zˆ1 = −zˆ, zˆ2 = 0, zˆ3 = zˆ,
for a certain quantity zˆ ≈ 0.84 (Both of these simplifications follow from the symmetry
of the problem.) One can further show analytically that the function p(z) satisfies
p′(z) < 0 for all z < −zˆ/2,
p′(z) > 0 for all z > −zˆ/2,
as illustrated in Figure 4.
Suppose that there are two options A and B, and that in the attribute currently
under consideration, xA > xB, so that A would be preferred (at least on this dimen-
sion) if accurately observed. What is the likelihood of its being viewed as superior
on this dimension by a DM with limited processing capacity? The answer depends
not only on the value of C, but on the prior to which the DM’s perceptual system is
adapted.
Let us first consider a prior with respect to which the options A and B are “typ-
ical,” namely, a Gaussian distribution with µ0 = (x
A + xB)/2 and σ0 = (x
A− xB)/2,
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so that the average value of the attribute for options A and B is equal to the mean
value under the prior, and both A and B are an “average” distance from the prior
mean (i.e., one standard deviation). With respect to this prior, the normalized values
are zA = 1, zB = −1. When C = 0.5 bits, p(1) = 0.668, p(−1) = 0.037. Hence A
is perceived as superior (r = 3) on this attribute with probability 0.668, as ordi-
nary (r = 2) with probability 0.295, and as inferior (r = 1) with probability 0.037;
correspondingly, B is perceived as superior with probability 0.037, as ordinary with
probability 0.295, and as inferior with probability 0.667. Let us say that A is per-
ceived as strongly superior to B (A >> B) if A is perceived as superior and B is
perceived as inferior, while A is simply superior to B (A > B) if either A is perceived
as superior and B is not, or B is perceived as inferior and A is not. Then with this
baseline prior, A is perceived as superior to B with probability 0.840, and as strongly
superior with probability 0.446.
These probabilities shift if the prior changes. For a general Gaussian priorN(µ, σ2),
and a capacity of 0.5 bits, the probability that A is perceived as strongly superior to
B will equal
Pr(A >> B) = p(zA)p(−zB) = p
(





µ+ σ0 − µ0
σ
)
This is plotted in panel (a) of Figure 7, as a function of (µ−µ0)/σ0 on the horizontal
axis and σ/σ0 (on a logarithmic scale) on the vertical axis. Note that Pr(A >> B)
depends only on these two ratios; the two axes of the figure show the effects of vari-
ation in the mean and standard deviation of the prior respectively. The probability
that A is perceived as at least somewhat superior to B is also a function only of those
two ratios, and this function is plotted in panel (b) of the figure.47
One observes from panel (a) that when the prior mean is midway between xA
and xB, increases in the standard deviation of the prior lower the probability that A
will be perceived to be strongly superior. This is because the normalized value zA
falls, as a consequence of which p(zA) falls; and p(−zB) = p(zA) falls for the same
47Note that Prob(A > B) as defined here is not the same quantity as is plotted in Figure 5. The
quantity in Figure 5 is represents the predicted frequency of a certain answer in a two-alternative
forced choice experiment, where one stimulus or the other must be judged brighter even in the event
of a tie (identical subjective representations), which occurs with positive probability when the set
of possible subjective representations is discrete. In Figure 7(b), instead, the probability is plotted



































































Figure 7: The probability that the superior option (with respect to a particular
attribute) will be perceived as strictly superior, if xA = µ0 + σ0, x
B = µ0 − σ0, and
the processing capacity allocated to perception of the attribute is 0.5 bits. Panel
(a) shows the probability that A is perceived as strongly superior, panel (b) the
probability that it is perceived as at least somewhat superior. The point I indicates
the baseline prior (µ0, σ0).
reason. If µ increases (so that the prior mean is closer to xA than to xB) for a given
standard deviation, the probability also falls. In this case, zA again falls, while −zB
rises by the same amount. Hence p(zA) falls while p(−zB) rises, and because log p(z)
is strictly concave in this region, log p(zA) falls by more than log p(−zB) rises, and
Pr(A >> B) falls. The same is true, however (simply switching the roles of zA and
−zB) if µ decreases. Hence Pr(A >> B) is maximized, for a given value of σ, when
µ = µ0 — that is, when the prior mean is precisely midway between x
A and xB.
The effects of a change in the prior on Pr(A > B) are less easily summarized.
For values σ ≥ σ0 (that is, when the distance between xA and xB is no more than
two standard deviations), the qualitative effects of variations in µ and σ are the
same as those just discussed. However, for lower values of σ (so that xA and xB
are farther apart, relative to the range of variation expected under the prior), the
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calculations are more complicated. Consider again the case in which µ = µ0. If σ is
sufficiently smaller than σ0, an increase in σ again causes z
A = −zB to fall, but this
can increase the probability that A is perceived to be superior, as shown in panel (b).
The reason is that when σ0/σ > zˆ/2 ≈ 0.42, p(z) is a decreasing function of z for
z near zB = −zA = −σ0/σ. This implies that as σ rises (while still in this range),
p(zB) = p(−zA) falls. This means that both the probability that rA > 1 (so that
A is not perceived to be inferior) and the probability that rB < 3 (so that B is not
perceived to be superior) increase.
Thus far we have considered the effects of changing µ and σ while holding the
upper bound C on processing capacity fixed. But as noted above, if θ is given and C
is endogenous, then a change in σ will require a change in C. The required change can
be determined by lining up the new value of σ2/θ with the appropriate row of Table 1
(note that the reciprocal of this quantity is given in the second column of the table),
and observing the value of C in that row. We must therefore also consider the effects
of such a change in C. An increase in C allows both an increase in the number of
distinct subjective representations of this attribute, and a reduction in the degree of
randomness of the subjective representations associated with given objective values
of the attribute. This implies greater accuracy in judgments about the relative values
of different options with regard to the attribute in question, as shown in Figure 5.
It also allows the estimate xˆ(r) to track the true value of the attribute with greater
accuracy. For example, Figure 8 plots the function φ(z) defined in (2.11), for each
of several values of C, again for the case of a Gaussian prior. The function gives the
mean normalized subjective value as a function of the true normalized value of the
attribute. One sees that in each case, φ(z) is an increasing, antisymmetric function
(φ(−z) = −φ(z)), which is concave for z > 0 and correspondingly convex for z < 0. In
fact, for any finite positive C, φ(z) approaches a finite positive asymptote as z → +∞,
and a corresponding finite negative asymptote as z → −∞. The function necessarily
reaches an asymptote because the number of subjective representations in the optimal
information structure is finite (for any finite C), and there is accordingly some largest
(and some smallest) value xˆi. Hence it is a general prediction of this theory that there
should be diminishing sensitivity to larger departures of the value of the attribute —
in either direction — from its mean value under the prior. Eventually, there is no
further sensitivity at all to further increases in the magnitude of the departure.
It is worth noting that the diminishing sensitivity result depends on the assump-
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Figure 8: Mean normalized subjective value as a function of actual normalized value
z of a particular attribute, under different values of the capacity limit C. Panel (a)
gives more details of the effects of tight capacity limits for z of modest size. Panel
(b) shows the effects of higher capacity limits in the case of more extreme z.
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tion of a constraint on the required capacity C, rather than on the mutual information
I. Under an optimal information structure subject to an upper bound on I (discussed
in section 1.3), φ(z) increases by less than the increase in z, but for each value of the
upper bound I, φ(z) is a linear function of z (φ(z) = kz, for some constant 0 < k < 1
that is increasing in I). Thus the sensitivity of the estimate of the attribute to changes
in the actual value of the attribute would be the same over the entire range of pos-
sible values of the attribute. In the present theory, instead, φ′(z) is high for small
values of |z| (it may be near or even above 100 percent, if C is not extremely small),
but substantially lower for large values of |z|, and approaches zero for extreme values
of the attribute. This reflects the fact that under the criterion proposed here, it is
optimal to concentrate the perceptual system’s capacity for discrimination on those
parts of the range of possible values that occur with high probability, while under
the Sims criterion, there is no reason not to maintain equal discriminability over the
entire range.
The point at which the diminishing sensitivity becomes important in the present
theory depends on the value of C. The value of φ(1) reported in the final column of
Table 1 indicates the average value of the marginal sensitivity φ′(z) over the range
−1 ≤ z ≤ 1; while this is much less than 1 for values of C equal to 0.75 bits or
fewer, it is close to 1 for all values equal to 1.25 bits or higher. (This can also be seen
from the plots in the top panel of Figure 8.) On the other hand, the bottom panel
of Figure 8 shows that for larger values of |z|, the marginal sensitivity remains much
less than 1 even for considerably larger values of C. For any given range of values
of |z|, there is a minimum capacity C such that for any capacity limit of that size
or greater, the marginal sensitivity over that range will be fairly close to 1; but the
capacity C that is required is larger the wider the range of values of |z| in question.
3 Implications for Choice Behavior
I now discuss some of the implications of the model of inattentive valuation proposed
above for observed choice behavior. I shall assume that a DM chooses among available
options on the basis of the subjective evaluation of each option, choosing on any given
occasion the option that has the highest subjective evaluation at that time. (This
does not imply that the same choice will be made each time that a given DM is
presented with the same set of choices, since the subjective evaluation of the option
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on each occasion for choice will be drawn from a certain probability distribution.)
The assumption that choice maximizes subjective value at the time of choice is
not the only reasonable one, given our assumption of limited information-processing
capacity; one might instead suppose that the information about the subjective values
of the various options that is used in the decision should also be limited, rather than
assuming that a precise ranking of options’ subjective values is possible. It is entirely
possible to extend the theory in that direction, with the result that the probability
of choosing a particular option would be predicted to be higher when its subjective
evaluation is higher, though even precise knowledge of the current subjective valua-
tion would not suffice to yield a definite prediction about the option that would be
chosen on that occasion. For simplicity, however, I shall not pursue such an extension
of the theory here; the analysis below assumes that available information-processing
capacity is not a quantitatively relevant constraint at the stage at which a final de-
cision is made on the basis of the current subjective evaluations. This is a limiting
case of a more general theory that deserves further study.48 The qualitative conclu-
sions reached below as consequences of assuming non-trivial capacity constraints on
earlier-stage processing of information about the individual attributes of individual
options should continue to be relevant under that more general theory, even if the
precise quantitative implications of the simpler model examined here may require
modification.
3.1 Stochasticity of Choice
One immediate respect in which the predictions of this theory differ from standard
economic decision theory is that choice is predicted to be stochastic, even from the
standpoint of an observer who can measure the values of all relevant attributes of the
options available to the DM. This is because the theory proposed above implies that
48The models of information-constrained choice in Woodford (2008) or Matejka and McKay (2011)
instead consider the polar opposite case: precise observations of the characteristics of all of the avail-
able options are assumed to be available as inputs to the final decision, but the amount of information
that can be used in that decision is subject to a (single, global) capacity constraint. As between the
two simplifications of the complete problem, it seems likely that abstraction from the consequences
of capacity constraints on earlier-stage processing will make an even greater quantitative difference.
Certainly the other type of theory is less consistent with observations such as the focusing effects
discussed in section 3.2 below.
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there will be a distribution of subjective valuations, rather than a single numerical
value, associated with each option. This is not simply a theoretical possibility; it is a
nearly inevitable feature of the optimal information structure, according to the above
theory.
As long as the shadow value of processing capacity θ is positive, then for each
attribute i to which the DM pays any attention at all (i.e., the information structure
involves more than one possible subjective representation ra of that attribute), the
probability distribution of subjective representations will be non-degenerate in the
case of at least some objective values xa, that occur with positive probability (under
the prior to which the information structure is optimally adapted). Equation (2.10)
implies that if θ > 0, there must be a set of values x with positive measure for
which θ(x) > 0; and for any such value x, equation (2.7) then implies that there is
a positive probability of occurrence of each of the subjective representations ri that
occurs under any conditions. The randomness of the evaluation of this attribute then
implies randomness of the subjective ranking of options for at least some pairs of
options, that are encountered with positive probability according to the prior.
This non-standard prediction of the theory accords with a considerable amount
of empirical evidence. The stochasticity of choice in experimental situations has
long been noted by psychologists.49 In addition to the evidence from laboratory ex-
periments on individual decision problems, the hypothesis that choice is a random
function of the measured characteristics of goods is a standard specification in econo-
metric models of discrete choice (McFadden, 1974, 2001). The hypothesis that choices
are random, with the probabilities of different discrete options varying continuously
with the payoffs associated with each option — so-called “quantal response equilib-
ria” — has been argued by game theorists to provide a better explanation of observed
behavior in a variety of strategic situations (Goeree et al., 2008; Kets, 2007). And the
hypothesis of similarly quantal responses — captured by the econometric hypothesis
of a smooth “hazard function” rather than a sharp threshold for adjustment — has
been argued to better explain the timing of discrete adjustments by firms in a variety
49For example, Luce (1959) writes that his “presupposition ... that choice behavior is best de-
scribed as a probabilistic, not an algebraic phenomenon, ... is by now a commonplace in much
of psychology,” though “a comparatively new and unproven point of view in utility theory.” He
also suggests that “economists when pressed will admit that the psychologist’s assumption is prob-
ably the more accurate, but they have argued that the resulting simplicity warrants an algebraic
idealization” (p.2), a view that he seeks to rebut.
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of contexts, including adjustments of prices, of the firm’s labor force, and of its capital
stock (Caballero and Engel, 1993, 1999; Caballero et al., 1997).
In the economics literature, the preferred interpretation of stochastic observed be-
havior has been to suppose that choices are deterministic functions of an individual’s
preferences and constraints, but that preferences and/or costs of acting are subject to
(unobserved) random variation. Econometric models of discrete consumer decisions
are commonly justified in terms of a model of optimal choice in which the utility
associated with each good is random (McFadden, 1974); a popular interpretation of
“generalized S-s models” of discrete adjustments by firms is that each firm’s fixed cost
of adjustment is a random draw from a probability distribution, each time the firm
again considers whether to adjust (Caballero and Engel, 1999; Dotsey et al., 1999).
While these are possible interpretations of stochastic choice behavior, I believe
that there are important advantages of an interpretation in which the randomness
results from noise in the DM’s perceptions of the objects among which he must choose.
First of all, the assumptions about the random variations in the determinants of
choice that must be made to justify typical econometric specifications on conventional
grounds are often implausible. For example, they typically imply an independent
draw of the random preferences and/or random adjustment cost each time a decision
is made. But while random variation in these determinants of choice over time is
plausible enough, it is hardly obvious that a completely independent draw should
occur each time a choice is made (which should be extremely frequently, in a model of
the timing of discrete adjustments without information frictions). The independence
of the random component over time is instead a natural consequence of a model with
noisy observations of the objects of choice, if one supposes that the attributes of
the available options must be observed again (through the same capacity-constrained
perceptual system) each time a choice is made.
Similarly, the kind of “hazard function” for the occurrence of discrete adjustments
that is found to best fit the data is often one in which the probability of adjustment at
any time remains bounded away from zero even when the current gains from adjust-
ment (conditional on knowledge of the true state) fall to zero.50 This is possible under
50For example, the hazard function that is non-parametrically estimated in Caballero et al. (1997)
has this property. As discussed in Woodford (2009), the large number of small price changes observed
in the size distribution of individual price changes, as documented by Midrigan (2010), can only be
explained by a hazard function for price adjustments of this kind.
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the assumption of choice under full information with a random cost of adjustment,
but one must assume that the distribution from which the adjustment costs are inde-
pendently drawn at each choice point contains an atom of probability mass at a cost
of zero, as discussed in Woodford (2008). This is hardly a natural assumption about
the nature of random variation in adjustment costs. Under the assumption that the
choice situation is imperfectly observed, instead, it is easy to explain why there is
some probability of adjustment even when the (correctly evaluated) gains from ad-
justment are zero: the situation is with some probability mistakenly perceived to be
one in which adjustment would be worthwhile. This is not simply a possible form of
imperfect perception, but a consequence of an optimal information structure under a
theory of the cost of more precise information of the kind proposed here: the degree
of awareness of the choice situation that would be required to reduce the probability
of such mistakes to zero is much too costly (in terms of the required processing ca-
pacity) relative to the savings that would result from the elimination of unnecessary
adjustments.51
The hypothesis of imperfect awareness of the characteristics of the options in the
choice set is also a much more specific hypothesis, at least as formulated here, than
the hypothesis of random utility and/or random costs of action. While econometric
implementations of models of fully-informed choice with random fundamentals often
assume some specification of the random fundamentals with only a small number of
free parameters to be estimated, there is seldom a clear theoretical justification for
adoption of that specification; once one admits the hypothesis that the fundamentals
may vary randomly, the possible types of random variation are very many. The
hypothesis of random perception, in itself, is similarly subject to a very wide range
of possible interpretations and hence has similarly little predictive content.52 But
51This is particularly likely to be the case if the value of adjusting depends on a vector of attributes
of the firm’s current situation, each of element of which must be separately observed. Then awareness
of whether the complete vector is near one of the points at which the value of adjusting is zero will
not generally be possible without precise awareness of the value of each of the individual attributes
over a large range of possible values.
52This does not mean that there is no ground for preferring this general class of hypotheses to the
random-utility hypothesis. If a random-utility model assumes that utility is monotonic in certain
attributes under all realizations of the random preferences, then it will imply that a dominated
option should never be chosen, regardless of the nature of the randomness. Observed choices of that
kind are instead easily rationalized under a hypothesis of random perception of value.
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the hypothesis of an optimal information structure given the statistics of the set of
choices that the DM expects potentially to encounter makes a much more definite
prediction. If it turns out that the predictions of a theory developed along these
lines are accurate — not simply in predicting that choices will be stochastic, but in
predicting the character of the stochastic relationship between objective conditions
and the choices that are made — then this will be an important reason to prefer such
a theory over the hypothesis of random fundamentals.
3.2 Focusing Effects
The theory proposed above also implies that the probability of choosing a particular
option from a particular choice set will not depend solely on the true values u =
∑
a xa
of the various options. The entire vector of values of the various attributes xa, and
not simply their sum, is relevant, because the sensitivity of choice to variations in
value along the various dimensions will not generally be the same, even though (under
my choice of units) the true value of the option is equally sensitive to changes along
any dimension. Even if we consider only the mean subjective valuation (MSV) of
each option,53 this will be a sum of the form
∑
a µa(xa), where the functions µa(·)
for the various attributes are not generally linear functions with identical slopes for
each a. Indeed, even the mean slopes E[µ′a(xa)] will generally be generally different
for different attributes, as illustrated in Table 1 above.
As a particularly extreme example of differential salience of the various attributes
of the available options, we have seen that it is possible for some attributes to be com-
pletely ignored (in the notation used above, the subjective representation of options
along that dimension is the same for all options), even though the available options
vary to some extent along this dimension and the attribute is of some relevance to
the DM’s utility. (In the normal-prior case discussed above, this occurs if and only if
σ2a ≤ 0.75 θ for a particular attribute.) More generally, Table 1 shows that decisions
are predicted to be more sensitive to variation in a particular attribute when the set
of potential options (according to the prior) includes a greater range of variation in
the contribution to utility from this attribute.
“Focusing effects” of this kind are frequently observed.54 For example, Schade
53Under the choice rule proposed here, of course, the probability of choosing one option over
another is not solely a function of the means of the two distributions of subjective valuations.
54Here, as is common in the literature, I discuss focussing effects in terms of a difference between
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and Kahneman (1998) document a “focusing illusion” in judgments of life satisfaction
under alternative circumstances: they find that subjects judging the quality of life of
others living in California as opposed to the Midwest exaggerate the extent to which
people are happier in California, relative to subjects’ reports about their own life
satisfaction in the two locations, because of an excessive focus on the difference in
climate. Similarly, Kahneman et al. (2006) argue that people exaggerate the degree
to which greater wealth would contribute to their degree of happiness, both in life
choices and in certain kinds of survey questions, relative to the degree of effect that
it actually has on experienced happiness, as measured by surveys that require people
to report their feelings in real time.
Koszegi and Szeidl (2011) point out that these and many other focusing effects
reported in the literature can be explained by a general hypothesis according to
which people place excessive weight on attributes in which their available options
differ more.55 Thus the weight placed on climate in judgments about hypothetical
life satisfaction in different locations is excessive because the options do obviously
the relative sensitivity of choice to different attributes and the relative weight that those attributes
have in people’s “true preferences.” This raises a question about how “true preferences” are observed,
if not from the choices that are made. In the literature cited in the text, a comparison is made
between ex ante judgments about options, on the basis of a description of their consequences, and
judgments on the basis of experience. (One may suppose that the ex ante judgments are based
on imperfect perceptions of each of the individual attributes xa, which must then be aggregated to
form a judgment about the desirability of the option, while reported experience involves an imperfect
perception of the experienced value of u. Tom Cunningham suggests an alternative way of verifying
the existence of focussing effects, which would be to look for evidence that the relative weight placed
on different attributes in choice varies depending on the choice set. For example, in the case of goods
with three attributes, each of which matters equally for utility, the theory proposed here implies
that (2, 1, 0) should have a higher MSV than (0, 2, 1), in pairwise comparisons; but that (0, 2, 1)
should have a higher MSV than (1, 0, 2) in pairwise comparisons, while (1, 0, 2) would also have
a higher MSV than (2, 1, 0) in pairwise comparisons. The non-transitivity is possible because the
DM’s perceptual system is adapted to a different distribution of values for the three attributes in
each case. Under this approach to testing the implications of the theory, focusing effects would be a
type of context effect (or menu effect). The theory’s prediction of context effects is discussed further
in section 3.3.
55Bordalo et al. (2010, 2011) and Bordalo (2010) propose a more complex model of the determi-
nants of the relative “salience” of particular attributes of the options among which one must choose,
but one of their key ideas is similar: they argue that the salience of a particular attribute (payoffs
in a particular state of the world, in the case of choice between lotteries) is increasing in the degree
to which the options differ in that attribute.
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differ significantly along this dimension; the fact that they also differ (to a smaller
extent) on many other dimensions that, cumulatively, result in people’s being no
happier on average in California is taken insufficiently into account. Similarly, people
may choose a higher-paying job despite other features that reduce their happiness
(such as longer commuting time, longer hours, and so on), because the difference
between the possible job options is not as great along any of the other individual
dimensions. This type of theory can simultaneously explain an apparent “present
bias” in some decisions (such as whether to exercise on an individual day), where a
large difference in present enjoyment must be balanced against smaller consequences
for satisfaction on many future days, and an apparent bias toward excessively future-
oriented choices in some other contexts (such as career decisions), where small costs
over many nearer-term dates must be balanced against a single large benefit that may
be far in the future. The same hypothesis offers an explanation for why firms can
apparently increase demand by splitting the prices of their products into multiple
components that consumers treat as separate attributes (Morwitz, Greenleaf, and
Johnson, 1998).
The theory proposed here predicts the existence of focusing effects of these kinds.
As shown in Table 1, an optimal information structure will increase the average
sensitivity of MSV to a particular attribute when the expected range of variation
from the utility contribution from that attribute is greater. Suppose that the prior
distribution of values for each attribute a is a normal distribution N(µa, σ
2
a). Then
the optimal information structure for each attribute will be of the kind computed in
the numerical results described in section 2, but with a different amount of processing
capacity C allocated to the awareness of each attribute. If the total available capacity
is optimally allocated across the attributes, then the value of θ will be the same for
each a, and the value of σ/θ1/2 for each a will be proportional to σa. Thus the values
of C for the different attributes will be ordered in the same way as the values of σa
are ordered; and as shown in the table, a higher value of C means a higher average
sensitivity of MSV to the objective value of that attribute.
More precisely, the theory proposed here implies that the MSV of an option spec-




where φ(z;σ/θ1/2) is a function defined in section 2.3, and za ≡ (xa − µa)/σa is the
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normalized value of attribute a. Hence the partial derivative of the MSV with respect
to increases in the value xa of any attribute is equal to φz(za;σa/θ
1/2). Because of
the properties of the φ(z;σ) function shown in Figure 8, we see that this derivative
is decreasing in the absolute value |za| for any given value of σa, and increasing in σa
for any given value of za.
More specifically, suppose that a DM must choose between two options x1 and
x2, and that the DM’s perceptual mechanism is furthermore adapted to a prior for
each attribute with mean and variance equal to the mean and variance of the sample




a)/2, σa = |x1a−x2a|/2. Then




a − x1a) > 0, (3.1)
where for each a, λa ≡ φ(1;σa/θ1/2) is precisely the quantity reported in column 3
of Table 1, when σa/θ
1/2 is equal to the square root of the reciprocal of the value
reported in column 2. Thus in this case (for a given cost of processing capacity θ > 0),
the table can be used to directly read off the weights λa that indicate the degree of
distortion involved in the comparison of MSVs rather than true values.
The predicted focusing effect can easily lead to preference reversals. Suppose that
option 2 is substantially superior in one attribute (x20−x10 = b > 0), but inferior to the
same small extent (x2a − x1a = −c < 0) for each of a large number of other attributes,
a = 1, . . . , N. If b > 1.74 θ1/2 > c,56 then it is optimal for the DM’s perceptual
system to ignore attributes 1 through N altogether (λa = 0 for 1 ≤ a ≤ N), while
λ0 > 0. It follows that option 2 will be valued more on average, and will be chosen
more often, because the subjective representation of the options pays attention only
to the attribute in which option 2 is substantially superior.57 On the other hand, if
56This condition depends on the value of θ. One can show, however, that θ necessarily falls in the
range where these bounds are satisfied, if and only if the total capacity C allocated to perception of
these N +1 attributes is positive, but less than the value of C corresponding to a value of 1.32(c/b)2
in the second column of Table 1. For example, if b is 7.1 times as large as c, then it is optimal to
allocate all processing capacity to the perception of attribute a = 0 as long as C is no greater than
3.5 binary digits.
57Note that even in this case, the model predicts only that option 2 will be chosen more often, not
that it will always be chosen. While option 2 is objectively superior with regard to attribute 0, the
subjective representation of this attribute of each of the options will be stochastic, and there will
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Nc > b, option 1 is objectively preferable to option 2; that is, the DM would prefer
it if enough attention were paid to the evaluation of the two options.
The most important difference between the theory proposed here and the one
proposed by Koszegi and Szeidl (2011) is that in their theory, the sensitivity to a
particular attribute is an increasing function of the range of variation in the value
of that attribute across the options in the DM’s current choice set,58 whereas here
it depends on the range of variation in that attribute under the prior to which the
information structure has been adapted.59 Of course, it makes sense to suppose that
the amount of variation present in the choice set will have some relation to the degree
of variation in that attribute to which the DM’s perceptions have adapted; indeed,
one might reasonably suppose that marketers should have some ability to influence
the perceptual discriminations of their customers by varying the set of choices with
which they are presented (as is in the case of the well-documented “decoy effects”
discussed below). The assumption that the distribution of possibilities to which the
perceptual system has adapted is always precisely the set of options in the current
choice set would be one possible specification of the present model.
But while this would allow the model to make extremely sharp predictions (an
obvious appeal of the assumption of Koszegi and Szeidl), I find it implausible that
adaptation to changing choice situations should always be that rapid. I would sug-
gest instead that the prior should reflect experience with some class of decision situ-
ations, to which the current choice set belongs,60 but it hardly seems efficient (given
remain a positive probability (less than 1/2) of option 1 being perceived to be superior to option 2
in this attribute. If the difference b is sufficiently great, this probability may be small.
58To be more precise, Koszegi and Szeidl assume that what is relevant is the set of options in a
DM’s “consideration set,” which may be only a subset of the full choice set, for reasons that are
exogenous to their theory of focus-dependent choice. But in any event, only the options currently
under consideration are assumed to determine the weight given to a particular attribute.
59There are a number of other technical differences, though these are less obviously crucial to the
qualitative predictions made about focusing effects. In Koszegi and Szeidl (2011), the subjective
valuation of a particular attribute is a deterministic linear function of the true utility contribution of
that attribute of the option, whereas in the present theory the relation is nonlinear and stochastic.
Also, in the theory of Koszegi and Szeidl, it is only the difference between the maximum and
minimum values of the attribute that are represented in the choice set that matters for the weight
placed on that attribute, whereas other features of the prior distribution also matter in the present
theory (which does not even assume that bounded minimum and maximum values necessarily exist
or differ across attributes).
60More precisely, one should say, to which the current choice situation is perceived to belong —
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information-processing constraints) for each individual choice situation that is ever
encountered to be treated as its own category with its own, optimally tailored infor-
mation structure. Nor is it obvious that it is only one’s actual choices on different
occasions that contribute to the distribution of possibilities in the prior. It is well
known from experiments that choices from among a particular set of options can be
influenced by getting the subject to think about something, even if it is not part of
the choice set.61 This suggests that it may be most realistic to assume that the prior
distribution reflects the frequency with which one has considered options with this
particular attribute, including reasons for consideration of the option when one may
not have actually had an opportunity to choose it. Such an assumption about the
prior would be consistent with the interpretation proposed in section 1.3 for adapta-
tion phenomena in perceptual experiments.62
Gabaix (2010) proposes a theory of focusing effects that is even more closely re-
lated to the one proposed here. In Gabaix’s theory, like that of Koszegi and Szeidl,
decisions are based on a subjective valuation of the form
∑
a λaxa, where the weights
λa may differ from 1, the weight in the DM’s true utility function. But Gabaix pro-
poses that the weights {λa} are chosen so as to minimize the expected discrepancy
between true and subjective valuations, under a prior distribution for the values of
the attributes that will be encountered, subject to an upper bound on
∑
a |λa|. The
only important difference between Gabaix’s theory and the one proposed here is the
cost function (or constraint) that is assumed for possible mappings of the vector of
objective characteristics into subjective representations. Unlike the theory proposed
here, Gabaix assumes (at least in the leading example of his theory) that the sub-
jective representation must be a deterministic, linear function of the vector x, and
proposes a cost that depends on the coefficients of the linear function. The theory
as this classification should itself be subject to an information-processing capacity constraint, and
hence be only stochastically related to the actual characteristics of the current choice situation.
61The “anchoring effects” documented by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) are a celebrated example.
62Kahneman (1992) draws an analogy between anchoring effects in choice behavior and the obser-
vation in psychophysics experiments that judgments about the intensity of a stimulus are influenced
by other stimuli to which the subject has recently been exposed, even if not asked to express a
judgment about them. The explanation proposed here would be the same in both cases: merely
having paid attention to something to something that possesses the attribute in question influences
the prior distribution of values for that attribute to which a subject’s perceptions of that attribute
are then adapted.
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proposed here is much less restrictive as to the relations between objective character-
istics and subjective representations that are considered, and indeed under the cost
function that I propose, the optimal relation is neither linear nor deterministic, even
in the quadratic-Gaussian case.
The particular cost function proposed by Gabaix is not derived from an underlying
theory of information-processing constraints, but is chosen to reflect the idea that
more “sparse” representations should be preferable. The theory proposed here does
not directly assume that sparsity is a goal in itself, and the optimal information
structure characterized above can easily imply that some attention will be paid to
all attributes. (This will typically be the case when there are not extreme differences
in the contributions of the different attributes to the overall degree of variation in
utility across possible options.) Nonetheless, the cost function proposed here also
implies the possibility of corner solutions, in which some attributes will be ignored
altogether though they contribute non-negligibly to variations in true utility across
options. (One such example has just been discussed.) It is surely true that sometimes
aspects of a choice situation are ignored altogether even when they are of some modest
relevance to the DM’s objective; but it is not clear that this occurs more often than
can be accounted for by the kind of theory proposed here, or as pervasively as Gabaix’s
theory would imply. And Gabaix’s theory gives no explanation for the stochasticity of
choice, or to phenomena connected with “diminishing sensitivity” to further increases
in a particular attribute, of the kind discussed below.
3.3 Context Effects
Another difference between the theory proposed here and standard rational choice
theory is that choice that will be made between particular options are not predicted
to depend solely on the attributes of those options. Not only is the subjective rep-
resentation of each option different from the objective vector of attributes, but it
is not predicted to be a function solely of that vector of attributes, either. In the
theory proposed here, the DM’s perceptual system is optimized for a particular prior
distribution for each of the attributes of potential options; hence the probability of
choosing one option over another depends on what that (joint) prior distribution is
like. Presumably it is derived from experience (real or imagined) with particular




Figure 9: Location of three brands in attribute space. Introduction of the “decoy”
brand C increases market share of “target” brand B at the expense of competitor A.
ability that the DM will choose a given option over another can vary depending on
the context in which the choice between these options is presented to her. “His-
tory and experience” become important determinants of choice, as McFadden (1999)
comments in the passage quoted earlier.
In fact, context effects are often noted in the experimental psychology and be-
havioral economics literatures. An important class of context effects are choice-set
effects, in which the probability of choosing one option over another is affected by
which other options are also in the DM’s choice set. An especially well-documented
example is the “decoy effect,” often employed by marketers to manipulate consumer
behavior. Suppose that consumers may choose between two competing brands, and
that two brands differ in two different attributes, let us say quality and price. The
location of the two brands in this two-dimensional space are represented by points
A and B in Figure 9. Here the horizontal axis represents quality (increasing from
left to right) and the vertical axis represents price (increasing from top to bottom,
so that higher points are preferable on this dimension as well). In the case indicated
in the figure, neither brand dominates the other: one (brand B) is of higher quality,
but is also more expensive. It is well known to marketers that sales of brand B can
be increased by introducing a third option (the “decoy”) with characteristics at a
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point such as C in the figure. The decoy is not intended to attract purchasers, as
it is dominated by brand B, though not by brand A. Nonetheless, a large number
of studies have confirmed that introduction of an “asymmetrically dominated” decoy
of this kind increases the number of buyers who will choose brand B and reduce the
number who choose brand A (Huber et al., 1982; Heath and Chatterjee, 1995).
Such results are inconsistent with the standard theory of rational choice; in par-
ticular, they violate the usual axiom of “independence of irrelevant alternatives,”
according to which choice should be unaffected by the removal from the choice set of
options that are not selected even when included. They may, however, be consistent
with a model of inattentive valuation of the kind proposed here, if the addition of the
decoy changes the probability distributions for the various attributes to which the
DM’s perceptual system is adapted.
Suppose, for simplicity, that the probability distribution for each attribute to
which the perceptual system is adapted is a normal distribution with the same mean
and variance as the distribution of values of that attribute in the DM’s choice set.
(The assumption that the prior distribution is Gaussian allows us to use the results
from section 2 for numerical solution of the Gaussian case.) Then when A and B
are the only two brands available, the prior distribution is characterized by µa =
(xAa + x
B
a )/2 and σa = |xBa − xAa |/2 for each attribute. In this case, the normalized
values of the two goods are +1 and −1 for each attribute, though good B has the
greater value (+1) of the quality attribute, while good A is superior (a normalized
value of +1) with regard to price.
When the decoy C is added to the price set, the distribution of values of each
attribute now consists of {xAa , xBa , xCa }, where on the price dimension xCa < xBa < xAa ,63




a . This means that the mean µp for the
price attribute falls, while the mean µq for the quality attribute may or may not
rise.64 But in any event, the absolute value of the change in mean, in units of the













63Recall that in the notation used here, xjp is higher for an option j if its price is lower, so that
the option is more attractive on the price dimension.




q )/2, which is to say, C is better than the previous mean in
the quality attribute.
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Furthermore, the standard deviation σq of the quality attribute decreases, but the
standard deviation σp of the price attribute does not decrease as much (in percentage
terms), and may even increase.65
If we suppose that the capacity Ca allocated to perception of each of these at-
tributes remains the same after the addition of the decoy (though perceptual coding
is re-optimized for the new distribution of values for each attribute, subject to the
capacity constraint), and that that capacity happens to equal one-half of one binary
digit, then we have constructed an example in which the consequences of introduction
of the decoy can be read off from Figure 7. Note that under the initial distribution of
values for the attributes, brands A and B are located at normalized values za equal to
+1 and -1, corresponding to the situation represented by the point labeled I in Figure
7. The consequences of changes in the distributions after introduction of brand C for
the relative valuation of A and B are then shown in the two panels of the figure.
In these plots, the new distribution for the quality attribute will necessarily be
somewhere to the south of the point labeled I, but may be either to the left or
right of I. The new distribution for the price attribute will be to the left of I —
and a greater horizontal distance from I than the point representing the new quality
distribution — and higher on the vertical axis than the point representing the new
quality distribution (though not necessarily higher than I).
In panel (a) of Figure 7, we see that a simultaneous movement to a higher value
of σ and a greater horizontal distance from the µ = µ0 axis always reduces the
probability that the superior good on a given dimension will be regarded as strongly
superior. This means that, while in the absence of the decoy, there should be an
equal probability of recognition of the low-price good as strongly superior on the
price dimension and recognition of the high-quality good as strongly superior on the
quality dimension, with the decoy, there should be a smaller probability of recognition
of the low-price good as strongly superior in price than the probability of recognizing
the high-quality good as strongly superior in quality. Both the fact that the prior
is more diffuse with respect to the price attribute (after introduction of a high-price
decoy), so that brands A and B are not so many standard deviations apart on this
dimension, and the fact that the prior mean is shifted farther in the case of the price
65A little algebra shows that the standard deviation of the price attribute increases if and only if
xCp is enough less than x
B
p for the distance of x
C
p from the previous mean to be more than
√
3/2
times the distance of xBp from the mean.
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attribute, making it particularly unlikely that brand B will be judged extreme on
this dimension, contribute to this conclusion.
In panel (b) of Figure 7, we can similarly observe the consequences for the prob-
ability of judging one brand to be at least somewhat superior on a given attribute.
Here movement farther from the µ = µ0 axis again always reduces the probability of
recognition of the superior brand as superior, but the effect of increasing σ does not
always have the same sign. Nonetheless, one observes that it is possible for the net
effect of the two changes to lower the probability of recognition of the superior brand
as superior. Hence it can easily be the case that introduction of the decoy results in
there being a smaller probability of recognition of the low-price good as superior in
price than of recognizing the high-quality good as superior in quality.
In the above discussion, it has been assumed that equal processing capacity is
allocated to the perception of the two attributes; but this may not be realistic. In
their meta-analysis of studies of decoy effects, Heath and Chatterjee (1995) find a
greater ability of decoys to increase the market share of high-quality/high-price brands
(the case shown in Figure 9) than to increase the market share of low-price/low-
quality brands; but no such difference would be predicted by the model just sketched,
which is perfectly antisymmetric between brands A and B.66 Intriguingly, Heath and
Chatterjee also find in their own experiments that decoys increase the market share
of a high-quality/high-price target brand more, in the case of a “traditional” subject
population (MBA students at an urban, semi-private research-oriented university),67
but that decoys increase the market share of a low-price/low-quality target more
in the case of a “non-traditional” subject population (undergraduate students at a
rural, teaching-oriented state university). One might expect the former subjects to
pay more attention to differentiations in quality when choosing purchases, and less
attention to price, while the latter subjects pay more attention to price and less to
quality.68 In this case, the studies suggest that decoys are more effective in reducing
66The situation described is unchanged if one interchanges brands A and B and at the same time
interchanges the “price” and “quality” attributes.
67Here “traditional” means typical of the subjects used in other marketing studies, such as those
reviewed in their meta-analysis.
68For example, Heath and Chatterjee report that the “non-traditional” subjects are significantly
more likely to agree with the statements “I don’t care what others think about what I buy,” “I buy
less expensive brands,” and “I believe store brands are as good as national brands,” and significantly
less likely to agree that “I purchase products for their status value.” Curiously, they do not find
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the attention paid to an attribute to which the subject is already relatively insensitive
than they are in reducing the attention paid to an attribute with which the subject
is highly concerned.
The theory proposed here predicts such an asymmetry, if we do not assume that
equal processing capacity is allocated to perception of the two attributes. Suppose,
for simplicity, that the amount of capacity allocated to perception of quality is large
enough that we can (as an approximation) assume that the quality of each brand is
accurately observed, while there is (as above) only 0.5 bits of capacity allocated to the
perception of price. (This could be consistent with the theory of attention allocation
proposed in the previous section, if σq >> σp. Note that here I am assuming that the
subject’s perceptual system is adapted to a quality distribution that is not calibrated
on the basis of the range of qualities in the current choice set.) Then brand B will
be preferred to brand A if and only if
xˆAp − xˆBp < xBq − xAq . (3.2)
If we further suppose that the true price difference between the two brands exceeds
their true quality difference, by a factor
xBq − xAq ≈ 0.6(xAp − xBp ),
then there will be a range of values of σp around σ0 ≡ (xAp − xBp )/2 such that for any
prior in that range, (3.2) will hold as long as A is not perceived to be strongly superior
to B on the price dimension, but will fail if it is. If A is perceived to be superior, but
not strongly superior to B, xˆAp − xˆBp = 0.84σp, but 0.84σ0 = 0.42(xAp −xBp ) < xBq −xAq ,
so that (3.2) holds as long as σp is not too much greater than σ0. If instead A is
perceived to be strongly superior to B, xˆAp − xˆBp is twice as large, and then since
1.68σ0 = 0.84(x
A
p − xBp ) > xBq − xAq , (3.2) will not hold, unless σp is substantially less
than σ0.
In this case, the probability that brand A will be preferred to brand B is equal
to Pr(A >> B), the quantity plotted in panel (a) of Figure 7. If we suppose that
any significant difference in the two populations’ responses to statements that directly ask about
the importance of “quality” as opposed to saving money. It seems likely that while the “non-
traditional” population does pay more attention to cost, they prefer not to think of themselves as
sacrificing quality, but instead challenge whether conventional markers of quality represent higher
quality.
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perceptions of price are adapted to a prior that is calibrated to the mean and standard
deviation of the prices of the brands in the current choice set, then the prior when
only brands A and B are offered will correspond to point I in the figure. The model
then predicts that brand A should be chosen nearly 45 percent of the time. However,
the introduction of the asymmetrically dominated decoy C should lower µp, while it
may or may not raise σp. It can be observed from Figure 7(a) that the reduction of
µp should lower Pr(A >> B), and hence lower the probability that brand A will be
preferred to brand B. If there is no reduction in σp, or σp actually increases, then
one can say unambiguously that the probability of preferring A to B must fall. At
the same time, Pr(A >> B) will still fall in the case of a sufficiently modest decline
in σp. Hence if the degree to which C is more expensive than B is great enough, the
model clearly predicts a reduction in the probability of preferring brand A to brand
B.69
Of course, Figure 7 is computed under the assumption that the processing capacity
C allocated to the particular attribute remains unchanged despite variations in µ and
σ. In the previous section, we have discussed the fact that an increase in σa for some
attribute a should increase Ca, in order to maintain a common value of θ across
attributes. If the reallocation of processing capacity across different perceptual tasks
occurs more slowly than the adaptation of the coding scheme to make more efficient
use of the existing processing capacity for a given attribute, then the analysis above
suffices for the short-run effect of the introduction of the decoy brand. If instead
we suppose that the reallocation of processing capacity occurs equally quickly, then
an increase in σp should increase Cp (as discussed in the previous section), and this
should tend to counteract the reasons for a reduction in the perceived price advantage
of brand A discussed above. However, even in the latter case, it remains possible for
the introduction of the decoy to lower Pr(A >> B). For example, in the case that
brand C is not enough more expensive than brand B to actually raise σp, there would
be no reason for Cp to increase, and the effects are as discussed above.
Thus the asymmetric model explains in a fairly simple way why the introduc-
69Heath and Chatterjee also report a “range effect,” according to which an increase in the range
of prices in the choice set (by introducing a brand C that is more expensive even than B) results in
a greater reduction in the market share of A than in the case that C is only dominated by B on the
quality dimension. The desirability of increasing the range of prices, so as to ensure an increase in
σp, can be explained by the analysis presented here.
67
tion of a decoy can shift purchases from a low-cost/low-quality brand to a high-
quality/high-cost brand. The same model predicts that the introduction of a decoy
that is asymmetrically dominated by the low-cost brand should not be equally effec-
tive at shifting purchases to that brand. If Cq is large, one cannot expect changes
in the prior distribution for the quality attribute to make any material difference for
the perceived difference in quality between the two brands; the effects of the prior
on perceptions are only significant when C is small. Hence the introduction of an
unusually low-quality decoy cannot be expected to reduce the salience of the quality
differential between A and B. The decoy would only be effective at increasing the
market share of brand A if it were able to increase the probability that A is per-
ceived to be strongly superior on the price attribute (i.e., the attribute on which it is
superior). But Figure 7(a) shows that adding an additional inexpensive option, and
raising µp above µ0, will only lower the probability that A is perceived as strongly
superior. The fact that the introduction of a new brand that is not as inexpensive
as B necessarily lowers σp should be helpful, but will not necessarily outweigh the
effect of the increase in µp. Furthermore, to the extent that a reduction in σp results
in a reduction in the processing capacity allocated to the perception of price, the
introduction of the decoy is even more counter-productive. Hence it should not be
surprising if decoys are less effective in this case.
Of course, the roles of “price” and “quality” in the analysis above are reversed in
the case of subjects for whom Cp >> Cq. Hence the theory also provides a potential
explanation for the finding by Heath and Chatterjee that in the case of their “non-
traditional” subject pool, decoys are more effective in shifting purchases from a high-
quality/high-price brand toward a low-price/low-quality brand than in the opposite
direction.
Bordalo (2010) and Bordalo et al. (2011) similarly propose to explain decoy
effects in terms of a shift in the relative salience of the brands’ differences along





a, where the weight λ
j
a placed on attribute a in evaluating option j depends
on the “salience ranking” of that attribute for that option. The salience of attribute
a for option j depends on the degree of contrast between the value xja of this attribute
for option j and the distribution of values of attribute a across the entire choice set;70
70The precise mathematical definition of salience is slightly different between Bordalo (2010) and
Bordalo et al. (2011). In the first paper, it is a sum of pairwise contrasts between option j and
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the weights {λja} are then determined by an ordinal ranking of the saliences of the
various attributes of option j. Note that in this theory, unlike those of Koszegi and
Szeidl (2011) or Gabaix (2011) discussed above, the weights {λja} are specific to each
option j, rather than being the same for all options, because the relative salience of
the various attributes can differ across options.
The Bordalo et al. definition of “salience” as an increasing function of contrast
implies that the sensitivity of the subjective valuation of option j to variation in the
value of a given attribute a depends on the degree of contrast between the value xja
and a distribution of values for that attribute.71 The theory proposed here is sim-
ilar, insofar as the probability of a given subjective valuation of an option along a
particular dimension is predicted to be a function of where the value xja falls within
a prior probability distribution for attribute a. There are, however, some important
differences between the present theory and theirs. In their theory, subjective valua-
tion is a deterministic function of the objective characteristics of the options in the
choice set. This yields simpler and sharper predictions, but fails to account for the
stochasticity of observed choice. In their theory, salience is also a function purely of
the attributes of the options in the choice set, rather than of “prior distributions”
for the various attributes that may derive from other experience. This makes the
theory’s predictions in a given application much less ambiguous; but it means, for
example, that their theory offers no explanation for the asymmetry between the use of
each of the other options in the choice set, whereas in the second it is simply a measure of the
contrast between xja and the mean value of attribute a over the elements of the choice set. These
two definitions do not lead to equivalent rankings because “contrast” is not a linear function of the
two quantities being compared.
71Cunningham (2011) proposes a related theory, in which preferences over options defined by
vectors of attributes depend on the distribution of values for each attribute in some “comparison
set” of options; his key hypothesis is that the weight placed on a given attribute in evaluating
all options is a decreasing function of the magnitude of that attribute for any of the options in the
comparison set. This theory would seem to imply that increasing the price of the “decoy” brand (i.e.,
lowering xCp ) should increase the relative weight on price in people’s preferences, so that the classic
decoy effect should not be observed. Cunningham reaches the opposite conclusion by supposing
that it is “price” rather than “inexpensiveness” that is the attribute, so that a higher-priced decoy
should reduce sensitivity to price. Under the theory proposed here, instead, it does not matter
whether we treat higher-priced goods as possessing higher or lower numerical values of the attribute
in question; what matters for perception is where a given option’s value of the attribute falls within
the distribution of values for that attribute, and all predictions would remain the same if the sign
of the numerical value of an attribute were to be reversed for all options.
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a decoy to increase demand for a high-quality/high-price good and the use of a decoy
to increase demand for a low-price/low-quality good. I believe that it will instead
have to be accepted that “history and experience” matter for choice, as McFadden
proposes, despite the difficulties that this implies for clean hypothesis testing.
3.4 Reference-Dependent Valuations
One of the most celebrated findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is that when
choosing among gambles, people appear to evaluate gains and losses from individual
choices rather than the different final situations that they may reach after a sequence
of events. This notion is, of course, quite contrary to a basic postulate of the standard
theory of expected utility maximization. Kahneman (2003, 2011) calls this postulate
“Bernoulli’s error.” “Bernoulli’s model is flawed,” he writes, “because it is reference-
independent: it assumes that the value that is assigned to a given state of wealth
does not vary with the decision maker’s initial state of wealth” (Kahneman, 2003, p.
460).
For example, Kahneman and Tversky present different groups of experimental
subjects with the following two choices:
Problem 1 In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1000. You are
now asked to choose between (a) winning an additional 500 with certainty, or (b) a
gamble with a 50 percent chance of winning 1000 and a 50 percent chance of winning
nothing.
Problem 2 In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 2000. You are
now asked to choose between (a) losing 500 with certainty, and (b) a gamble with a
50 percent chance of losing 1000 and a 50 percent chance of losing nothing.
They report that substantial majorities of their subjects choose the sure thing in
Problem 1, and the gamble in Problem 2. Yet in each of the two problems, the choice
is between identical probability distributions over possible final wealth states: option
(a) yields one’s initial wealth plus 1500 with certainty, while option (b) yields one’s
initial wealth plus 1000 with a 50 percent probability and one’s initial wealth plus 2000
the other 50 percent of the time. Thus the evaluation of these options is evidently
not merely a function of the probabilities assigned to different final wealth states.
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Kahneman and Tversky propose instead that in each problem, the different possible
final wealths are evaluated relative to a reference point corresponding to the wealth
possessed prior to the decision; it is the fact that the reference point is higher by 1000
in Problem 2 that results in a different evaluation of the relative attractiveness of the
two lotteries.
The theory of inattentive valuation proposed here provides an explanation for
such findings, that remains a variant of rational choice theory, and that still include
the standard (von Neumann-Morgenstern) theory of choice over lotteries as a limiting
case (the case in which the processing capacity allocated to the evaluation of one’s
options is large enough). Suppose that, as in Bordalo et al. (2010), we treat each
of the possible outcomes for a lottery as separate attributes that must be evaluated.
In the above example, we may suppose that each of the four options (two in each
problem) has two attributes: the final wealth achieved in each of two states, that occur
with equal probability, and so receive equal weight in the DM’s utility function. (In
the case of a sure thing, we assign the option the same value of both attributes, as the
outcome is the same in both states.) Choice between two options will then depend
on the relative size of the subjective estimate
∑2
s=1 xˆs for the two options, where
for each option, xˆs is the subjective estimate of the value of final wealth in state s
under that option. The estimate xˆs for each state will be a function of the subjective
representation rs of the value of final wealth in that state.
According to the theory presented above, the conditional distribution p(rs|xs) over
subjective representations in the case of a given objective final wealth xs is adapted
to a particular distribution of possible final wealths associated with choice situation
of that kind. The distribution to which the DM’s perceptions of value are adapted
may well be different in situations like Problem 1 than in situations like Problem
2; hence the subjective perceptions of options (a) and (b) may be different in the
two problems, even though the probability distributions over final wealth in the two
options are the same in both problems. This is the way in which valuations are
predicted to be reference-dependent in the present theory.
For example, suppose that the DM recognizes the class of choice situations in
which “you have been given 1000, and now are asked to choose between lotteries”
as different from the class of situations in which “you have been given 2000, and
now are asked to choose between lotteries,” and so perceives the options presented
using a perceptual system that has been optimally adapted to different distributions
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of potential outcomes in the two cases. If the DM has no reason to expect the types
of gains and losses that may be offered by the lotteries to depend on her wealth at
the time that the choice is presented, then the prior distribution over possible levels
of final wealth should indeed be different between the two classes of situations: the
entire probability distribution should be shifted up by 1000 in the case of the second
class. If the distribution of possible net gains from a lottery payoff in either state
of the world is assumed to be a Gaussian distribution, then for either state of the
world, in both classes of choice situations the prior distribution over possible final
wealths should be a Gaussian distribution N(µ, σ2), and the standard deviation σ of
this distribution should be the same for both classes of situations, but the mean µ
should be higher by 1000 for the second class. Since the standard deviation σ is the
same for both classes of situations, then — supposing that the ex ante probability
of encountering choice situations in the two classes is also expected to be equal — it
makes sense for the same processing capacity C to be allocated to perceptions of the
value of outcomes in each of the two cases. Then if the optimal information structure
for situations in class 1 involves conditional probabilities {p1(rs|xs)}, for some set
of possible subjective representations {rs} and values of xs on the real line, then
the optimal information structure for situations in class 2 will involve conditional
probabilities {p2(rs|xs)} defined over the same domain, where
p2(rs|xs) = p1(rs|xs − 1000)
for each subjective perception rs and each possible final wealth level xs.
Reversals of the preference ordering of the kind reported by Kahneman and Tver-
sky can easily be explained by reference-dependence of this sort in the way that
subjective perceptions of value are coded. For example, suppose that in each of the
two classes of choice situations, the prior distribution over possible net gains in state
s is expected to be N(0, 1000), and the processing capacity allocated to the percep-
tion of the value of outcomes in each class of situations is one-half a binary digit.
Then the optimal information structure in each case is of the kind shown in Figure 4,
where one unit on the horizontal axis in the figure should now be interpreted as an
increase in wealth by 1000. The mean normalized subjective value (MNSV) assigned
to each lottery in each of the two choice situations is then shown in Figure 10. Here
the horizontal axis x indicates the amount by which the DM’s final wealth exceeds
initial wealth, and the vertical axis plots zˆ, the DM’s estimate of the normalized value
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Figure 10: Mean normalized subjective value (vertical axis) for each of the possible
lotteries in two choice problems studied by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The
horizontal axis shows final wealth in excess of initial wealth, in each of the two
possible states under a given lottery. Black dots plot MNSV of the outcome in an
individual state; white dots plot the MNSV for a gamble in which the outcomes in
the two possible states are the two black dots at the endpoints of the dashed line.
Black line: plot of E[z|x] when the DM is initially given 1000. Black line: plot of
E[z|x] when the DM is initially given 1000. Grey line: plot of E[z|x] when the DM is
initially given 2000.
(i.e., (xˆ− µ)/σ, where xˆ is the estimate of x). Each of the two sigmoid curves plots
the function E[z|x] for one of the two classes of choice situations: the black curve
for class 1 (the prior with µ = 1000) and the grey curve for class 2 (the prior with
µ = 2000).72Note that since z is a linear transformation of x (with the same linear
transformation applied for all possible outcomes in a given class of choice situations),
whichever of a pair of lotteries has the higher MNSV zˆ will also have the higher MSV,
and should on average be preferred.
In the case of option (a), which results in x = 1500 with certainty, the MNSV
72Each of these curves reproduces the function φ(z) plotted in Figure 8 for the case C = 0.5 bits,
with a suitable linear transformation of the horizontal axis.
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is given by the black dot above x = 1500 on the curve corresponding to the given
choice situation. In the case of option (b), the MNSV for one state will be given
by the black dot above x = 1000 on the appropriate curve, while the MNSV for the
other state will be given by the black dot above x = 2000 on that same curve. The
overall MNSV for option (b), averaging the MNSVs for the two equiprobable states,
will then be given by the white dot above x = 1500, the midpoint of the dashed line
connecting the two black dots representing the MNSVs for the individual states. The
figure clearly shows that in this numerical example, option (a) should be preferred
on average to option (b) in Problem 1 (the black dot is higher than the white dot),
while option (b) should be preferred on average to option (a) in Problem 2 (the white
dot is higher than the black dot, in this case). Hence the experimental results of
Kahneman and Tversky are quite consistent with this model of valuation.
While the theory proposed here exhibits reference-dependence, there is not really
a “reference point” as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky. Perceptions are relative,
in the proposed theory, but they are relative to a probability distribution of values
to which the DM’s perceptual system has adapted. In the example above, the only
kind of change in the prior distribution that is considered is a shift in the mean, with
the distribution of values relative to the mean remaining unchanged; in such a case,
it is possible to say that what is perceived is x relative to the prior mean, and so one
can think of the mean as a “reference point.” But in fact, the theory of the coding
of perceptions of value proposed here is not based in any way on direct comparison
of the actual value with the prior mean or any other single reference value.73 In
the interpretation proposed in section 1.3, this is also true of adaptation in visual
perception — the phenomenon to which Kahneman and Tversky appeal in arguing
for the psychological realism of assuming there to be a “reference point.”
The theory proposed here also makes it clear that, in general, there is no reason to
73In the theory of reference-dependent choice of Koszegi and Rabin (2006), the reference point
is also replaced by an entire probability distribution of reference values, but the reason for this is
not very closely related to the one developed here. In the theory of Koszegi and Rabin, the only
thing that matters for choice, apart from “consumption utility” that is assumed to be observed with
perfect precision, is a set of pairwise comparisons between each possible outcome and each of the
individual reference values in a certain distribution, determined by the distribution of outcomes that
may actually occur. Each of the contributions to “gain-loss utility” from one of these comparisons
depends only on the outcome and the individual reference value in question; none of these individual
components of the evaluation depend on the entire distribution.
74
associate the reference point with the status quo, either at the time that a decision is
made or some earlier time. The coding of perceptions of value is predicted to depend
on the prior distribution of potential values to which the DM’s perceptual system
has adapted. This prior is presumably based on previous experience, but it need not
be determined by the DM’s current situation or situation in the recent past — it
might instead reflect a range of situations encountered in the past. Moreover, the
range of past situations that should determine the prior are not those that have been
experienced most recently, but rather those that represent situations most similar to
what the DM understands his current situation to be. In fact, the prior represents an
expectation about the possible outcomes in situations like the current one. Changes
in the status quo are relevant only because one’s current situation is often the most
relevant basis for a prediction of one’s future; when other bases for prediction exist,
these are what should be relevant.74
Insofar as it predicts that outcomes are evaluated not in absolute terms, but
relative to the DM’s expectations, this theory is related to the theory of reference-
dependent choice proposed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006); and a fair amount of ev-
idence suggests that expectations are indeed important for reference-dependent be-
havior (e.g., Crawford and Meng, 2011). There are, however, notable differences
between this theory and that of Koszegi and Rabin. Koszegi and Rabin propose that
the relevant expectation should be what they DM ordinarily receives in a situation
like the current one, given the choice that she characteristically makes — what could
have been received in options that are not chosen has no effect on the reference point.
In the theory proposed here, instead, the DM’s perceptual system is adapted to allow
more accurate evaluation of the kind of options that one expects to have occasion
to evaluate in a situation like the current one — hence all of the options that one
expects to evaluate (and needs to be able to see without too much distortion) are
relevant, not simply the ones that are chosen.
More generally, Koszegi and Rabin’s theory is really about the reaction to ob-
taining an outcome different from what was expected, and the way in which choice
should be affected by correct anticipation of that aspect of the way that one will
74Kahneman and Tversky themselves argue that the reference point may well be determined by
expectations rather than correspondingly simply to the status quo (1979, pp. 286-288). The present
theory proposes a more specific model of the way in which expectations are relevant, though still
without fully specifying the time at which the relevant expectations are formed.
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be affected (through this predictable reaction) by the outcomes that can result from
one’s various choice options — under the assumption that outcomes are perfectly
perceived when they occur, and also perfectly perceived in anticipation when consid-
ering which option to choose. (All surprises that occur represent intrinsic uncertainty
about which state of the world will occur, not any misperceptions of what one will
receive in a particular state.) Thus it is not a theory of distorted perceptions at all.
In the present theory, instead, differences between outcomes and expectations matter
because of the difficulty that one has recognizing things that one was not prepared
for.
The present theory can explain not only the reference-dependence of valuations,
but also another key feature of the behavior documented by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979): the coexistence of apparent risk-aversion in the domain of gains with appar-
ently risk-seeking behavior in the domain of losses. Thus in the case of Problem 1
above (a choice between certain and uncertain gains), the typical respondent preferred
the sure thing, even though both options imply the same mean final wealth; whereas
in Problem 2 (a choice between certain and uncertain losses), the typical respondent
preferred to gamble. In fact, both types of behavior are difficult to square with the
standard theory that postulates maximization of the expected utility of final wealth;
while the postulate of risk aversion (understood essentially in the way proposed by
Bernoulli) is a staple of textbook accounts of choice under uncertainty, the degree of
risk aversion with respect to final wealth that would have to be assumed to explain
people’s observed aversion to randomness of gains in individual gambles of modest
size is extraordinary, and quite inconsistent with other observed choices, as shown by
Rabin (2000). But the puzzle is even sharper when one recognizes that the hypothesis
of risk aversion (a strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function) that
might be invoked to explain choice in Problem 1 is certainly contradicted by observed
choice in Problem 2.
Kahneman and Tversky explain both types of behavior by hypothesizing that
choice depends on an evaluation of potential gains and losses from the individual
decision, and that such prospects are valued in accordance with a weighted average
of a certain nonlinear function of the net gain in each possible outcome, where the
weights depend on the probability of occurrence of the different outcomes,75 and the
75Another key feature of prospect theory is the proposal that the relative weight on each outcome is
a nonlinear function of the true probability. I do not propose any interpretation of this nonlinearity
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nonlinear “value function” is concave for gains but convex for losses. The explanation
provided by the present theory has a similar formal structure. The MSV assigned
to each of the lotteries in a given choice situation will be an average of the MSVs
of the final outcomes in each of the possible states, and the MSV for each state will
be a nonlinear function of the normalized objective final wealth in that state, which
is a linear transformation of the net gain in wealth as a result of the choice. The
nonlinear function used to convert objective values into mean subjective values is a
linear transformation of the function φ(z) plotted in Figure 8 and again in Figure 10;
and as we have seen, it is concave for z > 0 but convex for z < 0.
The present theory, however, derives this shape of the transformation function
from deeper theoretical assumptions, rather than directly assuming it on the basis
of observed behavior. The proposed theoretical derivation is closely related to the
explanation for the shape of the “value function” proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), who attribute both the concavity in the case of gains and the convexity in the
case of losses to diminishing sensitivity to progressively larger changes of either sign,
which they regard as a further instance of a general property of perception, that “the
psychological response is a concave function of the magnitude of physical change”
(p. 278). The present theory offers a deeper explanation, in terms of the efficient
use of limited information-processing capacity, for this general phenomenon, which
is then also applied to judgments of value, as Kahneman and Tversky propose. It is
worth noting that the present theory predicts the existence of diminishing sensitivity
to both gains and losses, without having to assume that gains and losses are coded
separately. Instead, we have considered the optimal subjective representation of a
single real variable that may be either larger or smaller than the prior mean, and
found that there should be diminishing sensitivity to larger departures from the prior
mean in either direction.
The theory presented here does not explain all aspects of the value function pos-
tulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In the examples computed above, the
transformation function is antisymmetric (φ(−z) = −φ(z)), whereas Kahneman and
Tversky propose as one of the key properties of their value function that it is “steeper
for losses than for gains.” The antisymmetry is not, however, a general prediction of
the type of theory proposed here; it obtains in the case analyzed in section 2 only
here; in cases like Problems 1 and 2 above, this issue does not arise, as the probability of each
outcome is the same.
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because of the assumed symmetry of the loss function with respect to over- and un-
derestimates of the true value and the assumed symmetry of the prior distribution
around its mean. An extension of the theory to cases with other loss functions and/or
other types of prior distributions will be an important topic for further investigation;
it would be interesting to know if the kind of asymmetry proposed by Kahneman and
Tversky can be explained through such a generalization.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also propose that there should be a kink in the
value function at the point of zero gain or loss, so that the negative value assigned to
a loss of a given size is a multiple greater than 1 of the negative of the value assigned
to a gain of the same size, even when the size of the gain is made arbitrarily small.
This feature of prospect theory has received particular emphasis in the subsequent
literature, notably because of the explanation that it provides for “endowment ef-
fects.”76 The theory proposed here provides no explanation for a kink at the value
of an attribute corresponding to the prior mean (or any other conception of the “ref-
erence point”); indeed, as noted above, there is really no “reference point” in this
theory.
It is possible that a more adequate theory would hypothesize separate coding
of gains and losses, as a consequence of which different valuations of small gains
and small losses could easily be possible. (This would mean assuming additional
constraints on the class of possible subjective representations than those assumed
in the relatively parsimonious theory explored here.) On the other hand, there are
other possible explanations for endowment effects than the hypothesis of a kink in the
mapping of objective values into subjective perceptions of value. It may be that people
perceive more accurately the attributes of objects already in their possession than ones
that they do not possess (but can see); or it may be that they make inferences about
the value of objects from the fact that someone else would offer an exchange, and not
simply from what they can observe about the objects’ characteristics. Hence it may
be possible to understand endowment effects, within a more general theory, without
changing the account given here of choice between lotteries.
76See, for example, Kahneman (2011), chap. 27.
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4 Conclusions
I have proposed a theory of errors in the valuation of options confronting economic
decisionmakers. In this theory, valuations are optimal, in the sense of minimizing
the mean of squared evaluation error, subject to an information-theoretic constraint
on the processing capacity required to observe the attributes of the options with a
particular degree of precision. I have shown that the resulting theory implies an
inevitable form of reference-dependence of valuations, insofar as the mapping from
objective characteristics to subjective valuations that will be optimal depends on the
prior distribution of potential valuations to which the DM’s perceptual system has
adapted.
I have argued that a theory of this kind predicts a number of types of departures
from the implications of full-information rational choice theory that have been ob-
served to occur in human decisions. These include stochastic variation in the choice
that is made from among a fixed set of options, focusing effects, decoy effects, val-
uation of risky options on the basis of the distribution of gains and losses from the
individual choice rather than implications for final wealth after many random events,
and the coexistence of risk-aversion with respect to gains with risk-seeking with re-
spect to losses. Other modifications of standard decision theory have been proposed,
of course, in order to account for each of these anomalies. The theory offered here,
however, offers the prospect of unified explanation of all of them on the basis of
a single departure from standard assumptions. For that reason, I believe that the
implications of this type of theory deserve to be analyzed in further detail.
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